Preserving Due Process: Applying Monell Bifurcation to State Gang Cases by Hayat, Fareed Nassor
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 1 Article 4 
October 2019 
Preserving Due Process: Applying Monell Bifurcation to State 
Gang Cases 
Fareed Nassor Hayat 
CUNY School of Law, fareed.hayat@law.cuny.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Fareed Nassor Hayat, Preserving Due Process: Applying Monell Bifurcation to State Gang Cases, 88 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 129 (2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and 
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact 
ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
129 
PRESERVING DUE PROCESS: APPLYING MONELL 
BIFURCATION TO STATE GANG CASES 
Fareed Nassor Hayat* 
ABSTRACT 
State gang statutes deprive criminal Defendants of their 5th and 14th 
Amendment due process rights by creating a mechanism by which 
prosecutors admit irrelevant, otherwise inadmissible, hearsay and unduly 
prejudicial character evidence in criminal trials.  This Article asserts that 
both well-established evidentiary standards and our commitment to 
fundamental due process protections are jeopardized by state gang 
statutes.  Moreover, state gang statutes were created, and have operated, 
to incarcerate poor, young men of color—including seasoned gang 
members, novice gang members, and simply accused gang members—
under a peculiar set of legal standards that violate the plain language of 
the United States Constitution. This Article proposes the use of the Monell 
bifurcation standard to address this problem.  Specifically, separating 
gang allegations from substantive criminal acts in the prosecution’s case 
in chief will ensure criminal Defendants, including gang members, due 
process of law.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of 
state gang statutes by challenging their common justifications, broad 
reach, and application.  Part II explores the effects of state gang statutes 
upon evidentiary standards and describes how the admission of unduly 
prejudicial character evidence amounts to a due process violation. Part 
III proposes the use of something akin to Monell bifurcation to state gang 
prosecutions to preserve criminal Defendants’ fundamental right to a fair 
trial. A Monell bifurcation requirement would compel state prosecutors 
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the substantive criminal offense, 
prior to the admission of any gang evidence in the criminal trial.  This 
application of the Monell bifurcation standard in State gang cases would 
serve to minimize the insurmountable prejudice of gang related evidence. 
  
 
* Fareed Nassor Hayat is an assistant Professor of Law at the City University of New York (CUNY) 
School of Law.  He teaches criminal law, criminal procedure and lawyering.   
1
Hayat: Preserving Due Process
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
130 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In November 2013, the Baltimore City Police Department (“BPD”), 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), armed with assault rifles, military 
armor, and tear gas,  kicked in doors, smashed windows, and entered 
the homes of mothers, fathers, grandmothers, grandfathers, girlfriends, 
cousins, and neighbors in  the economically depressed, drug-inflicted, 
and spiritually-defeated area of Greenmount, Baltimore City, 
Maryland.1  As a result of the raid, nearly fifty African American men 
were arrested.  They were charged with gang conspiracy, gang 
entrenchment in the Black Guerrilla Family (“BGF”),2 murder, drug 
distribution, witness intimidation, robbery, and an assortment of 
violent crimes.  This raid would later prove to be the largest gang 
indictment in Baltimore City history.  One of those young men was my 
client, KJ.3  The United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, 
the State’s Attorney of Baltimore City, the Baltimore City Police 
Commissioner, and the Baltimore City Mayor all heralded the 
invasion, capture, and detention of these “gang members” as a great 
success, insisting that the streets of Baltimore would be safer and that 
life would be easier to bear with the removal of these so-called 
predators.4,5    
 
 1. Greenmount has a 37.7% poverty rate compared to the overall 15.2% poverty rate in Baltimore 
City; a homicide rate of almost double the overall city at 39.9 homicides per 10,000 residents, compared 
to 20.9 homicides per 10,000 residents in Baltimore City overall. Further, the Greenmount area has a life 
expectancy of 65.9 years, compared to a life expectancy of 71.8 years in Baltimore City overall.  2011 
Health Profile Greenmount East, Baltimore City Health Department (2011), 
https://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/24%20Greenmount.pdf. 
 2. The Black Guerilla Family originally began as a political organization that “grew out of 
increasing inmate interest and concern about prison conditions in California and across the country and 
with the patterns of brutal repression and abuse on the inside . . . The Black Guerrilla Family was created 
to raise awareness, concern, and unity among inmates and the American public about both the harsh 
conditions that Black people faced as a whole, and the intense repression that Black inmates, especially 
those with unpopular political beliefs, faced inside California's prisons.”  Azadeh Zohrabi, Resistance and 
Repression: The Black Guerrilla Family in Context, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 167, 178 (2012). 
To this date, notwithstanding criminal gang activity, there exists an emphasis in BGF to fight against 
racial injustice. Id. 
 3. KJ’s full name will be omitted from this article. All sources relating to KJ’s case are on file 
with the author and available upon request. 
 4. Justin George, Baltimore Police Raid East Baltimore Homes, BALTIMORE SUN, (Nov. 12, 
2013), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-bgf-raid-20131112-story.html. 
 5. Notwithstanding the declaration of improved living conditions for the community, none of the 
law enforcement agents or elected officials addressed the catalyst for such “predators’” existence or a 
tangible plan to ensure that new generations of inner-city youth, would not follow the same blueprint of 
the “Underdeveloped Black America.” “The oppressed Black majority is generally more subject to the 
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Prior to the 2013 BGF gang indictment, law enforcement arrested KJ 
nearly twenty-five separate times, alleging crimes of theft, carjacking, 
robbery, assault, and murder. These arrests resulted in only one conviction 
for a charge of handgun possession.6  Despite his lone criminal 
conviction, KJ spent almost 75% of his adult life behind bars or on pretrial 
detention.7  In the 2013 BGF gang indictment, KJ was charged with gang 
conspiracy, first-degree murder, and four attempted murders, each as 
substantive criminal charges and predicate acts8 to the gang conspiracy 
charge.  He  was  also  charged  with use of a firearm in a crime of violence 
and thirteen other felonies.  KJ had already previously been charged with 
or suspected of every substantive allegation in the 2013 BGF gang 
indictment.9 After being detained for years awaiting trial on these prior 
 
violence of American capitalism than whites because (1) it is concentrated in the lowest paid, blue collar, 
unskilled and service sectors of the labor force; (2) it comprises a substantial portion of the total U.S. 
reserve army of labor, the last hired and the first fired during periodic recessions; and (3) it is the historic 
target of brutality within a racist culture and society, occupying an inferior racial position which has 
remained unaffected since the demise of slavery. America is not simply a capitalist state, but a racist state, 
a governmental apparatus which usually denies access and power to most Blacks solely on the basis of 
racial background.” MANNING MARABLE, HOW CAPITALISM UNDER DEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA: 
PROBLEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, 107-108 (South End Press 1983). 
 6. In 2011, KJ was charged with attempted murder.  The State alleged that KJ shot the 
complaining witness in the eye as an enforcer for the BGF. Jones v. State of Maryland, No. 113310058, 
2019 WL 2929034, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2019). The complaining witness refused to testify in the 
trial.  KJ was eventually offered and accepted a plea agreement to the handgun that was found in his 
possession just minutes after the shooting. “In 2013, Mr. Jones had plead guilty to the possession of a 
handgun charge in exchange for the State's agreement to nolle-pross, what is the act at issued in this case, 
the attempted murder of Perry Johnson.” Brief of Appellant-Defendant at 7, Jones v. State of Maryland, 
No. 113310058, 2019 WL 2929034, (Md. Ct. Spec. App.). While such a favorable plea would seem to 
support the need for the Maryland gang statute to hold dangerous criminal Defendant’s accountable, the 
reality, was that the complaining witness was the aggressor in the shooting, went back into a house, 
retrieved a gun and began firing at KJ where no firearms had been previously displayed.  His unwillingness 
to testify was not due to fear of retribution from the BGF as prosecutors and supporters of gang statutes 
purport, rather fear of incriminating himself in the attempted murder that he committed. 
 7. According to KJ’s criminal history report, he had been arrested twenty-three prior times before 
the gang indictment. Of these arrests, thirteen were as a juvenile. The earliest date occurred on September 
21, 2000.  In addition, there are two events without dates showing KJ in police custody. These two 
incidents labelled KJ as a gang member at age thirteen based on the Lotus notes gang database indicated 
in the report and used by Baltimore City police.  BALTIMORE POLICE DEP’T, Person Report (Oct. 18, 
2013).    
 8. A predicate offense is the criminal act that is “committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
or in association with a criminal gang.” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-804 (a)(2) (2017). 
 9. KJ was arrested on Jan. 12, 2007 for attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree 
murder, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, attempted armed robbery, illegal 
possession of a handgun and discharge of a firearm. All of the charges were dropped in Circuit Court on 
Nov. 6, 2007. Docket, State v. K.J., No. 107024028 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2007).  KJ was charged on Jul. 
11, 2008 with attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, armed carjacking, armed 
robbery, assault, and theft.  All charges were dropped on Aug. 3, 2009. Docket, State v. KJ, No. 
108193011 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2009).  On Nov. 10, 2008 KJ was charged with first degree murder, first 
degree assault, use of a handgun while committing a crime, and possession of a handgun. All charges 
were dropped on Aug. 8, 2010, but during this time KJ remained incarcerated in case Docket, State v. KJ, 
No. 108315058 (Md.Cir. Ct. Aug. 8, 2010).  On May 6, 2011, KJ was charged with attempted first degree 
3
Hayat: Preserving Due Process
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
132 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
criminal allegations, each case was independently dismissed.10 The State 
was unable to produce credible evidence to satisfy the very high burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.11     
To illustrate how gang statutes violate criminal Defendant’s due 
process rights, it is helpful to highlight one of KJ’s charges—murder. It 
is important to note that what is demonstrated through this example also 
occurred in the prosecution of each of the other substantive charges 
against KJ. KJ was accused of being the perpetrator of a 2007 murder in 
the hallway of a Baltimore City apartment building. However, the State 
initially lacked enough evidence to bring charges because there were no 
eyewitnesses, DNA, other physical evidence, credible motive, or 
circumstantial evidence connecting KJ to the murder. Indeed, the only 
evidence that detectives were able to gather were the statements of a self-
admitted member of the BGF, whom the prosecutors acknowledged was 
a felon, addict, thief, and liar.12 This specific witness was held on 
unrelated gun charges in Baltimore City and faced up to twenty-five years 
in prison.13  The witness claimed that KJ admitted to committing the 
 
murder, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, use of a handgun in 
committing a crime, possession of a handgun, reckless endangerment, and discharge of a firearm. All 
charges, except the handgun possession charge were dismissed. Docket, State v. K.J., No. 111126014 
(Md. Cir. Ct. May 6, 2011). 
 10. All but the handgun charged that KJ plead guilty to in 2011 were dismissed. See Docket, K.J., 
No. 111126014 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 6, 2011). 
 11. Prosecutors claim that due to witness intimidation cases involving alleged gang members are 
difficult to successfully prosecute. ALAN JACKSON, PROSECUTING GANG CASES: WHAT LOCAL 
PROSECUTORS NEED TO KNOW 5 (American Prosecutors Research Institute 2004), https://ndaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/gang_cases1.pdf (“Indeed, the trademark characteristic of a gang case is the difficult 
witness.”).  While witness intimidation does occur, an equal challenge to successfully prosecuting cases 
against alleged gang member is that prosecutors charge crimes that either did not happen, are over charged 
from their inception or based on officer fabrication or incredible witnesses. See H. Mitchell Caldwell, 
Reeling in Gang Prosecution: Seeking a Balance in Gang Prosecution, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 
341, 363 (2015); see, e.g., People v. Ellis, 735 N.E.2d 736, 741-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (finding 
prosecutorial misconduct in a gang case where the state used perjured testimony of a witness). 
 12. Self-admitted gang members, or equally culpable Defendants, are often used as witnesses 
against Defendants in gang cases.  Prosecutors effectively convince jurors that gang identity is deplorable 
for the Defendant being prosecuted.  See Ellis, 735 N.E.2d at 746. Yet, prosecutors compel jurors to find 
the same type of individuals credible in their testimony against the Defendant.  In KJ’s case, the prosecutor 
argued, in both the opening and closing statements, that the witnesses in the case against KJ were horrible 
people. See Tr., State v. KJ, No. 113310058, 68 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2016). In short, Prosecutors argue 
that gang members lie, cheat, commit crimes and exist in the muck and the mire of criminal gang activity.  
The prosecutor went on to argue that those government witnesses, who admit to being gang members, 
should be believed in their testimony against KJ, because in order to catch someone, like KJ, those who 
exists in the same places, someone covered in the same muck, can tell you what goes on down there. See 
id. 
 13. CM was charged in Baltimore City Circuit Court for firearm possession with felony 
conviction, maximum sentence of 15 years. See Docket, State v. CM, No. 107178031 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 
17, 2007). CM was also charged with handgun possession, maximum sentence of 3 years, probation 
violation with five years’ incarceration suspended. See Docket, State v. CM, No. 105293022 (Md. Cir. 
Ct. Oct. 20, 2005). He was also charged in case number 104280055 with 15 years incarceration suspended 
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murder even though he did not see the crime, nor did he have any 
distinctive knowledge of the crime.14 After a year of investigation, 
multiple witness interviews, an autopsy, and firearm examination and 
recovery, the state prosecutor declined to bring criminal charges against 
KJ.  The prosecutor believed that the word of the self-admitted gang 
member, as the only evidence available, was insufficient to charge KJ 
with first degree murder.15  
Nevertheless, in 2013 KJ was once again charged with the 2007 
unsolved murder.16 The factor that made the difference between 2007, 
when there was insufficient evidence to charge KJ with murder, and 
2013, when KJ was arrested, indicted, and detained, was the passage 
of the Maryland gang statue, Maryland Code § 9-804.17  Maryland 
Code § 9-804 defines a criminal gang as: 
a group or association of three or more persons whose members: [] 
individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity; [] 
have as one of their primary objectives or activities the commission of one 
or more underlying crimes, including acts by juveniles that would be 
underlying crimes if committed by adults; and [] have in common an overt 
or covert organizational or command structure.18 
 In 2013, a new prosecutor, one armed with a new legislative tool 
designed to prosecute suspected and actual gang members, charged KJ 
with the 2007 murder both substantively and as a predicate act for the 
2013 gang case. When KJ’s trial finally occurred in May of 2015, the 
detective who investigated the case in 2007 and 2013, was asked, under 
 
at the time of naming KJ as the murderer in the 2007 allegation. See Docket, State v. CM, No. 104280055 
(Md. Cir. Ct. Oct 10, 2004). 
 14. KJ was found not guilty of use of a handgun while in the commission of the murder, but in 
contradiction to the evidence presented at trial, found guilty of the substantive charge of murder.  In 
addition, Christopher Meadows claimed that the shooting was because the decedent had told on other 
individuals, not KJ, or BGF members, but unrelated members of a rival crew. Tr., State v. KJ, No. 
113310058, at 21 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2016); see also id. at 74 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 27, 2016). 
 15. Detective Lloyd, Progress Report, BALTIMORE POLICE DEP’T (May 19, 2009) (“[S]uspect 
[KJ], according to ASA D. Giblin, [in] the matter of the Homicide of Gregory Rochester, authorization 
for an arrest warrant for KJ was not approved.”). 
          16.   See Indictment, State v. KJ, No. 113310058 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2013).   
 17. First introduced in 2007, Maryland Code Criminal Law § 9-804 allows prosecutors to now 
introduce evidence that would normally be inadmissible hearsay to show a “pattern of criminal gang 
activity.” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-804 (2007). After its ratification in 2010, subsequent 
amendments to the language of the statute have imposed harsher and harsher punishments where 
consecutive sentencing to the substantive offenses is now mandatory if the Defendant is found guilty on 
§9-804 for 2 or more offenses. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-804 (a)(c)(ii)(2) (2010). Most recently 
in 2017, the punishments were made even harsher. They now read: “Except as provided in subparagraph 
(ii) of this paragraph, a person who violates this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject 
to imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding $ 1,000,000 or both.” CRIM. LAW. § 9-
804 (f)(i)(1) (2017). 
 18. CRIM. LAW § 9-804. 
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oath, what new evidence had been acquired between the determination 
made in 2007 that there was not enough evidence to charge KJ and the 
2013 trial involving the gang allegation. His answer was that “no new 
evidence” had been acquired.19  The following exchange can be found in 
the trial transcript:  
COUNSEL: You located more information to prove that KJ actually 
committed this murder, right?...                                              
DETECTIVE:  . . . No, sir 
COUNSEL: So, no new forensic evidence? 
DETECTIVE: . . . No, sir.  
COUNSEL: No new witnesses?  
DETECTIVE: . . . No, sir. 
COUNSEL: [How about] KJ's DNA? 
DETECTIVE: No, sir, there wasn't DNA. 
COUNSEL: [How about] eyewitnesses who saw KJ do [the murder]? 
DETECTIVE: . . . No, sir . . . 
COUNSEL: [How about] the recovery of the gun from KJ?  
DETECTIVE: No, sir20 
To satisfy Maryland Code § 9-804, prosecutors must prove that the 
individual was part of a gang by proving that the particular organization 
has customs and hierarchies. Prosecutors must also prove that three or 
more individuals entered into an agreement to commit a crime in 
furtherance of that organization or “gang.”21 Importantly, the statute 
permits prosecutors to use hearsay, evidence that is otherwise 
impermissible, and acts of other members of the conspiracy, to prove the 
gang’s existence.22   
In their attempt to prove the murder, prosecutors alleged that the 2007 
killing was committed in furtherance of the BGF, a “gang.”23 Thanks to 
this allegation, prosecutors were able to use Maryland Code § 9-804 to 
discuss multiple crimes in the Greenmount neighborhood purportedly 
committed by BGF members, to prove that KJ committed the 2007 
 
 19. Tr., State v. KJ, No. 113310058, 18-20 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 1, 2016). 
 20. Id.  
 21. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-804; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-801 (defining 
“criminal gang” as “a group or association of three or more persons whose members: [] individually or 
collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity; [] have as one of their primary objectives or 
activities the commission of one or more underlying crimes, including acts by juveniles that would be 
underlying crimes if committed by adults; and [] have in common an overt or covert organizational or 
command structure.”). 
 22. For example, in KJ’s trial, the state, over defense counsel’s objection, introduced the names of 
alleged BGF members allegedly associated with KJ. Tr., State v. KJ, No. 113310058, 38-39 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
June 6, 2016). The Court also allowed the statements of non-testifying alleged gang members to be 
admitted into evidence notwithstanding that KJ was unable to confront those witnesses. Tr., State v. KJ, 
30 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 27, 2016); Tr., State v. KJ, No. 113310058, 30 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 27, 2016). 
 23. Tr., State v. KJ, No. 113310058, 64-67 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2016).  
6
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murder—something that a prosecutor in ordinary circumstances would 
not be permitted to do.24 The State’s ability to simultaneously charge KJ 
with gang conspiracy and substantive murder helped the State secure a 
guilty verdict for murder with evidence that was insufficient to support an 
indictment in 2007. 
 Gang evidence, generally, and the Maryland gang statute, specifically, 
permits, requires, and intends to deprive criminal Defendants of their 
fundamental right to a fair trial through the use of unduly prejudicial 
character evidence.25  The admissibility of gang evidence through similar 
statutes across the country forces poor, young men of color, seasoned 
gang members, novice gang members, or simply accused gang members 
to defend themselves under a different set of legal standards than what the 
Constitution mandates.26 Gang evidence creates a peculiar system of 
justice by unjust means.  This different set of legal standards should be 
concerning for all criminal Defendants and those who seek justice. 
Believers in constitutional principles of fundamental fairness, equal 
protection, and due process must resist the slippery slope of permitting 
trampling of the detested “gang member” from becoming the trampling 
of us all.  The solution to ensure criminal Defendants’ fundamental right 
to a fair trial is applying the Monell bifurcation standard to state gang 
prosecutions.   
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides an overview of 
state gang statutes by challenging their common justifications, broad 
reach, and application. Part III explores the effects of state gang statutes 
upon evidentiary standards and explains how admitting unduly prejudicial 
character evidence amounts to a due process violation because it denies 
the criminal Defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. Finally, Part 
 
 24. For example, the court admitted a witness’s testimony concerning what he “heard” someone 
say about BGF violence. Tr., State v. KJ, No. 113310058, 22-23 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 3, 2016). The witness 
stated, “this gang I was a part of, I know how violent they are. I mean I've seen and heard what could 
happen.”  Id. at 17-19. The defense objected to what he “heard,” but was overruled. Id. at 20-25. The 
witness then testified that “death” happens to those who testify, without clarifying whether the basis of 
knowledge was what he “heard” or what he “seen.” Id. at 6-12.  
 25. A Defendant’s right to a fair trial is applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth amendment, stating: “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1. A Defendant’s constitutional right to fair trial 
is violated where the introduction of the [gang] evidence is so prejudicial as to render the trial 
fundamentally unfair. See People v. Albarran, 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 217 (2007). 
 26. State gang statutes permit trials based on criminal allegations that have been previously tried, 
plead, or dismissed with prejudice, in contradiction to the limitation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. See David R. Truman, The Jets and Sharks Are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal 
Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 683, 720-721 (1995) (exploring the rise of anti-gang legislation and how 
California’s STEP act and those statutes modeled after it are modeled under federal racketeering law); 
Linda Koenig and Doris Godinez-Taylor, The Need for Greater Double Jeopardy and Due Process 
Safeguards in RICO Criminal and Civil Actions, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 724, 729-30 (1982) (setting forth three 
situations in which a defendant faces double jeopardy for underlying predicate offenses). 
7
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IV proposes a solution to ensure criminal Defendants’ fundamental right 
to a fair trial the Monell bifurcation. A bifurcation requirement would 
compel state prosecutors to prove a substantive criminal offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt before the admission of any gang evidence, thus 
minimizing the risk of insurmountable prejudice and ensuring due 
process.  
Bifurcation begins a process of demystification of criminal Defendants 
in state gang cases.  Criminal Defendants in state gang cases are not “all 
powerful,” well-equipped members of a group who can avoid or 
overcome prosecution.  These Defendants are undereducated, under 
resourced, descendants of the oppressed, sometimes dangerous and 
violent, but almost always poor and minority, that police and legislators 
disproportionally degrade, disregard and hold to a completely different 
standard under the law. 
II. JUSTIFYING THE EXISTENCE AND REACH OF STATE GANG STATUTES 
A. The Racialized Gang Myth  
There is an ongoing national narrative suggesting that gang violence is 
on the rise.27 Research has shown, however, that concerns over gang 
violence are exaggerated.28 Indeed, there are fewer gang members today 
than there were a decade ago.29  Today, gang violence accounts for a 
smaller proportion of crime in relation to other causes,30 and the vast 
majority of gang members do not commit violent crimes.31 This Article 
 
 27. NAT’L GANG CTR., Measuring the Extent of Gang Problems (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/survey-analysis/measuring-the-extent-of-gang-problems (“The 
most recent estimate of more than 30,000 gangs represents a 15 percent increase from 2006 and is the 
highest annual estimate since 1996.”). 
 28. K. Babe Howell, Gang Policing: The Post Stop-And-Frisk Justification For Profile-Based 
Policing, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (“The notion that gangs are growing exponentially in 
number and membership and are responsible for the majority of violent crime is nearly impossible to 
reconcile with the fact that violent crime, and indeed all crime, is down throughout the country.”). 
     29. Judith Greene & Kevin Pranis, JUSTICE POLICY INST., Gang Wars: The Failure of Enforcement 
Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety Strategies, 3 (2007), http:// 
www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-07_REP_GangWars_GC-PS-AC-JJ.pdf (“All of the available 
evidence indicates that gang members play a relatively small role in the crime problem despite their 
propensity toward criminal activity. Gang members appear to be responsible for fewer than one in four 
drug sales; fewer than one in 10 homicides; fewer than one in 16 violent offenses; and fewer than one in 
20 index crimes.”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Greene & Pranis, supra note 29, at 4 (“National estimates and local research findings suggest 
that gang members may be responsible for fewer than one in 10 homicides; fewer than one in 16 violent 
offenses; and fewer than one in 20 serious [] crimes.”). Although 1 in 10 homicide being committed by a 
small portion of the population may seem of great concern, this Article argues that the perceived impact 
of gang violence, murders included, is much larger than reality supports. Another example comes from a 
report from the Durham County Criminal Justice Resource Center in North Carolina revealing that each 
8
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does not argue that gang violence does not exist; instead this Article 
argues that public perception of gang violence is disproportionate to 
reality.32 Police generated estimations identify a disproportionate number 
of young Black and Latino men as gang members, while other estimates 
suggest that white men make up 40% of gang membership.33 Police 
agencies’ definitions of gangs and gang members are not uniform; rather, 
police agencies are given discretion in defining gangs and identify their 
members.34 Police agencies routinely “rely on criteria that are 
predominantly non-criminal and relate to how a person looks, acts, who 
s/he is seen with, and what s/he wears to determine if one is a gang 
member.”35  When law enforcement estimates of racial makeup of gang 
membership were compared to surveys conducted through The National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, “African Americans and Latinos were 
roughly 15 times more likely than non-Hispanic Whites to be identified 
by the police as gang members.”36 These biased, police generated 
 
year an average of only 19.6% of the crimes committed in Durham County by “validated gang members” 
between 2009 and 2017 were violent crimes. Jim Stuit, DURHAM CTY. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE 
CTR., Gang Crime Report, 2009-2017 Durham, NC (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.dconc.gov/home/showdocument?id=25155. Also, we are heavily misled about the 
prevalence of gangs among young people. According to the latest National Crime Victimization survey, 
of the sample group of students age 12-18, only 10.7% reported gangs present at their schools. Christina 
Yanez & Deborah Lessne, Student Victimization in U.S. Schools: Results From the 2015 School Crime 
Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., at 5 (Dec. 2018), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018106REV.pdf;  see also Understanding Youth Gangs: Resources for 
Schools, TEX. SCHOOL SAFETY CTR. (Aug. 2015), https://txssc.txstate.edu/topics/school-
violence/articles/understanding-youth-gangs  (“Researchers caution against labeling all youth gang 
members as violent given that gang members do not necessarily specialize in violence, but rather spend 
the majority of their time 'hanging out' with friends as most youth do.”). 
 32. Howell, supra note 28, at 1. 
        33. See Greene & Pranis, supra note 29, at 3 (“Law enforcement sources report that over 90 percent 
of gang members are nonwhite, but youth survey data show that whites account for 40 percent of 
adolescent gang members. White gang youth closely resemble Black and Latino counterparts on measures 
of delinquency and gang involvement, yet they are virtually absent from most law enforcement and media 
accounts of the gang problem. The disparity raises troubling questions about how gang members are 
identified by police”). 
 34. K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself: The Impact of Allegations of Gang Affiliation on Pre-Trial 
Detention, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 620, 645-49 (2011) (Law enforcement agencies are given substantial 
discretion to identify and define gangs in their own way, thus some may include white supremacists, or 
bikers, or adopt other definitions. Law enforcement agencies determine criteria as well as create, maintain, 
and share gang databases for intelligence purpose.  Most gang units rely on criteria that are predominantly 
non-criminal and relate to how a person looks, acts, who he is seen with, and what he wears); Greene & 
Pranis, supra note 29, at 27 (listing criteria for gang database in California where only “two of the ten 
criteria” must be met. Two of those criteria include “associate[ion] with a known gang member on a 
regular basis” and “wears gang clothing, symbols . . . .”). 
 35. Howell, supra note 34, at 649.  
 36. Greene & Pranis, supra note 29, at 27 (comparing law enforcement surveys conducted through 
National Youth Gang Survey (“NYGS”) and youth surveys conducted through “[t]he National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which was sponsored by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, is the only 
source of survey data on youth gang membership in the United States that is based on a nationally 
representative household sample”). 
9
Hayat: Preserving Due Process
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
138 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
estimations lead to a disproportionate number of young Black and Latino 
men being charged with gang related crimes in comparison to their white 
male counterparts.37 Biased perceptions of criminality begets 
disproportionate estimations of Black and Latino gang involvement.  In 
turn, these over-estimations lead to unequal enforcement upon the bodies 
and souls of Blacks and Latino men.   Legal scholars have proven, through 
empirical data, that the use of gang affiliation as a basis of enforcement is 
not only unduly prejudicial,38 but also inherently racist.39 When faced 
with the evidence that we should be no more worried about gang members 
than any other alleged criminal or group, a Defendant, no matter his gang 
affiliation, should be provided the same rights the Constitution guarantees 
to all. 
B. The Rise of State Gang Statutes 
The Racketeer Influence and Corruption Act (“RICO”)  has been cited 
as the basis for the proliferation of State gang statutes.40   RICO’s 
 
           37. Howell, supra note 34, at 636. In this article, the author distributed surveys to defense attorneys 
nationwide inquiring, among other things, the race of the client. The findings were illuminating: “Most of 
the respondents had represented Black (86.8%) and Latino (86.8%) clients accused of having gang 
affiliations. Only 24.5% percent indicated that they had represented White clients with alleged gang 
affiliations. Finally, 13.2% of respondents reported representing Asian clients who were alleged to have 
gang affiliation. Despite the fact that nearly a quarter of respondents reported representing White clients 
with alleged gang affiliation, the comments indicated that Black and Latino clients were far more likely 
to face these allegations.” 
          38. Mitchell Eisen, Brenna Dotson, Gregory Dohi, Probative or Prejudicial: Can Gang Evidence 
Trump Reasonable Doubt?, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE DISC. 2 (2014). 
          39. Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Note: Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California’s STEP 
Act, 18 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J. 679, 683 (2009).  Despite researchers finding white youth comprise the most 
prominent racial group in all gangs formed after 1991, anti-gang legislation has led to the mass 
incarceration of minority racial groups because law enforcement agencies like California’s annual reports 
from the attorney general, “consistently focus on Black, Hispanic, and Asian gangs and make only passing 
reference to white street gang members.”  See also Class Action Complaint, Chicagoans for an End to the 
Gang Database v. City of Chicago, No. 1:18-cv-04242 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2018) (lawsuit including both 
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims), https://www.macarthurjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/cpd_gang_database_class_action_complaint.pdf;   IN THIS LAWSUIT INCLUDES 
BOTH A 14TH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS COMPLAINT AND A 14TH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAIM.  ALEXANDER, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS. (New York: [Jackson, Tenn.]: New Press; Distributed by Perseus Distribution, 
2010).  Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility And The Criminalization Of Youth Gangs, 28 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 958 (1993) (“The fight against street gangs is a fight against African-
American, Hispanic, and, to a lesser degree, Asian youth violence and not against the general plague of 
American violence.”). 
 40. Kim Strosnider,  Anti-Gang Ordinances After City Of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection 
Of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, And Equal Protection In The Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101, 
107 (2002) (“Ten states have comprehensive or omnibus statutory schemes dealing with gangs, many of 
them patterned after California's STEP Act or federal racketeering law.”); David R. Truman, Note, The 
Jets and Sharks Are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 683, 
686 (1995) (“California, home of the ‘street gang capital of the United States,’ took the lead in this 
10
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purported legislative intent was to target sophisticated criminal 
enterprises.41 Similarly, state gang statutes purportedly target those with 
knowledge that “[the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or 
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.”42   
Illinois has also codified a similar statute.43  
Similar to these states, twenty-six other states and the District of 
Columbia have gang prevention laws that criminalize participation in a 
criminal gang organization and acting in furtherance of the 
organization.44, 45  
The purported purpose of these State gang statutes is to provide 
prosecutors with a new set of tools to successfully prosecute and hold 
accountable criminal gang members and the organizations that supported 
them.46   Notwithstanding gang members’ minimal educational and 
 
statutory fight against gangs by passing the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Protection Act (STEP Act) 
in 1988. Similar in structure to the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO), the STEP Act creates a new substantive crime of participation in criminal street gang activity.”). 
 41. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588–89 (1981) (citing Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922–923 (1970)) (noting the following as the purpose of RICO: 
“(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity 
that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use 
of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money 
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of 
property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of 
social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate 
business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime 
activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent 
investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and 
foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and 
its citizens.”).  
 42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a). 
           43. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-5.  
 44. Highlights of Gang-Related Legislation, NAT’L GANG CTR. (Dec. 31, 2018), 
www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Legislation/Highlights.  
 45. Specifically, § 9-804(a)(1) prohibits “participat[ing] in a criminal gang knowing that the 
members of the gang engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-
804(a)(1). § 9-801 defines “criminal gang” as “a group or association of three or more persons whose 
members: [] individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity; [] have as one of 
their primary objectives or activities the commission of one or more underlying crimes, including acts by 
juveniles that would be underlying crimes if committed by adults; and [] have in common an overt or 
covert organizational or command structure.” Id. at § 9-801. A pattern of activity is defined as “the 
commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of two or more underlying 
crimes or acts by a juvenile that would be an underlying crime if committed by an adult, provided the 
crimes or acts were not part of the same incident.” Id. 
 46. For example, in passing California gang state, the legislature explicitly noted that “the 
Legislature, however, further finds that the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been caused 
by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the 
peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively, present a 
clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected . . . It is the intent 
of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs by 
11
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economic resources,47 state officials argue that gang members 
successfully surmounted prosecution under the old laws.  Since their 
passing, state gang statutes have been used to arrest, convict, incarcerate, 
and over-prosecute individuals that could have been, if guilty, 
successfully held accountable using traditional methods.48 Rather than 
investigate cases, develop credible evidence, and abide by constitutional 
constraints, prosecutors use gang statutes to skirt legal requirements and 
garner convictions where evidence may not support a guilty verdict. No 
empirical studies have been found supporting the policy position that 
“gang members” cannot be successfully prosecuted without a gang 
statute.49  Nonetheless, using gang statutes, prosecutors can “almost 
guarantee that the jury will hear gang evidence,”50 ensuring conviction 
where it may otherwise be unjustified because the statutes eviscerate 
evidentiary standards, allowing the prosecutor to use unduly prejudicial 
character evidence.51  
The Supreme Court has consistently urged that no matter the notoriety 
or horrendousness of the crime, the Defendant’s due process rights may 
 
focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of street gangs, which 
together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (2019). 
 47. Research has shown that gang members are more likely to come from poor neighborhoods and 
have low academic achievement. Karl G. Hill et al., Childhood Risk Factors for Adolescent Gang 
Membership: Results from the Seattle Social Development Project, 36 J. RES. CRIME 300, 322 (1999) 
(“Family composition (one parent in the home versus two) and poor family management significantly 
predicted gang membership . . . Poor school achievement, attachment, commitment, and aspirations at 
ages 10 to 12 all predicted later gang membership, as did being identified as learning disabled in 
elementary school.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Burris v. State, 78 A.3d 371, 383–84 (2013). In Burris, the Defendant, a gang 
member, was charged with murder but not the substantive gang statute. Id. (“he was not charged with a 
gang-related crime, such as participation in a ‘criminal gang’ under Sections 9–804(a) or (b) of the 
Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code or conspiracy to commit a crime with another gang member.”). 
The Defendant was found guilty, but the conviction was reversed because the appellant Court found that 
that the State had failed to prove a nexus between the crime and the alleged gang membership. Id. And 
although, the gang evidence was admitted in the trial, even without the gang statute, the point is that the 
State does not need gang statutes to admit in gang evidence nor does the State need a gang statute to prove 
guilt of the Defendant – apparent from the initial guilty finding. The State can go through traditional 
character exception such as proving identity, motive, or common scheme or plan. See, e.g., MD. R. EVID. 
5-404 (allowing evidence of other crimes to prove identity, motive, or common scheme). But, gang 
statutes have the ability to not even require the State to prove an exception, where the gang statutes 
themselves make gang membership a required element.  Gonzalez v. State, 366 P.3d 680, 687 (Nev. 2015) 
(noting that gang evidence is “generally not” admissible, but for, the gang enhancement in Nevada). 
            49. For example, there is no data supporting the idea that that gang members escape prosecution 
or conviction at a lower rate than non-gang member Defendants. Rather what is shown is that violent 
crime–gang related or not–is on decline. Howell, supra note 28, at 7 (citing studies that “confirm that 
crime has decreased by nearly 80% in the past two decades.”). To prove the necessity for gang statute 
would be a study looking at criminal acts (i.e. robbery, murder or otherwise) that are gang related and 
those that are not.  To be empirical, studies should show that gang members are found not guilty, or cases 
are dismissed at a higher rate. 
 50. Eisen, supra note 38, at 2. 
 51. See infra Part II (2). 
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not be compromised.52 State gang statutes, however, have left clients like 
KJ with limited protection. Specifically, the statutes, although not 
explicitly stated, deprive the Defendants of their due process rights and 
already few due process protections.53 
III. STATE GANG STATUTES VIOLATE CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’ 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  
This Part outlines how the constitutional rights of criminal Defendants 
are violated and diminished when prosecutors charge Defendants under 
state gang statutes. This Part proceeds in three parts.  First, it summarizes 
the general rules regarding character evidence in a criminal trial.  Next, 
this Part analyzes character evidence in the context of gang statutes in 
comparison to the prescribed rules of evidence for ordinary criminal trials. 
Finally, the last section of this Part analyzes the California Supreme Court 
case People v. Albarran in order to demonstrate how state gang statutes 
violate criminal Defendant’s constitutional rights by permitting 
prosecutors to rely on character evidence that would otherwise be 
impermissible—a clear due process violation.  
 A. Defining Character Evidence  
Character evidence is a term of art defined as evidence of a person’s 
general disposition or pertinent traits.54 Character evidence is “a synonym 
 
 52. Two examples of this are in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) and Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832–33, 224 (2006). In Miranda, the Defendant was found “guilty of 
kidnapping and rape,” but the Court still found, despite the crime alleged, that Defendants’ have a right 
against self-incrimination. In dissent, Judge Clark argued that the horrendousness of the allegations alone 
outweighed the due process concerns, stating that “Society has always paid a stiff price for law and order, 
and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark moments of the law . . . it may make the analysis more 
graphic to consider the actual facts . . . [o]n March 3, 1963, an 18-year-old girl was kidnapped and forcibly 
raped near Phoenix, Arizona . . . Yet the resulting confessions, and the responsible course of police 
practice they represent, are to be sacrificed to the Court's own fine-spun conception of fairness which I 
seriously doubt is shared by many thinking citizens in this country.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 
517–21 (1966) (Clark, J. dissenting).  Secondly, in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), the 
Supreme Court expressly rejected a relaxation of a Defendant’s confrontation clause rights, stating that 
“Respondents in both cases, joined by a number of their amici, contend that the nature of the offenses 
charged in these two cases—domestic violence—requires greater flexibility in the use of testimonial 
evidence. This particular type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim 
to ensure that she does not testify at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal 
a windfall. We may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing 
the guilty to go free.” Id. at 833.  
 53. See infra Part II (2). 
 54. “Evidentiary character refers to a person's general disposition or a general trait, such as 
honesty, chastity, violent temperament, or peacefulness.” Michael D. Claus, Note, Profiles, Syndromes, 
and the Rule 405 Problem: Addressing A Form of Disguised Character Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 983 (2012).  The term “character evidence” refers to proof either 
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for ‘reputation’” of the Defendant and is generally inadmissible under the 
common law.55  The Defendant’s reputation refers not to “specific acts” 
of the Defendant, but rather to a summary of opinions held within the 
Defendant’s community about the Defendant.56 Character evidence is 
largely found to be inadmissible to prove propensity.57 Propensity 
evidence is a type of character evidence which is commonly regarded as 
unfairly prejudicial, and thus, inadmissible.58 Such evidence refers to a 
Defendant’s character trait, which is then used to argue that the Defendant 
acted in conformity with that trait.59  
The ability to introduce character evidence depends greatly on which 
party, the State or the defense, is attempting to introduce the evidence and 
 
of a person's general moral character: good or bad, lawful or unlawful—moral or immoral—or of a 
specific character trait, such as honesty, courage, carefulness, generosity, violence, sobriety, or 
truthfulness. See MD. R. EVID. 5- 404(1). “‘[C]haracter’ has been described as “the tendency to act in a 
certain manner under given circumstances.” People v. Callahan, 74 Cal. App. 4th 356, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999); Williams v. State, 179 A.3d 1006, 1014 (2018) (explaining that to provide character evidence “the 
Defendant may call a witness to testify regarding the witness' personal opinion of the Defendant's 
pertinent trait, or about the Defendant's reputation for that pertinent trait.”). “The term ‘character’ refers 
to a generalized description of a person's disposition or a general trait of that person's disposition, such as 
for peacefulness, chastity or truthfulness.” Judge Liam C. Brennan, Admissibility of Character Evidence 
in Illinois Criminal Case, 22 DCBA BRIEF 38, 38 (2010).  
           55. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948). 
 56. Id. at 477 (“The witness may not testify about Defendant's specific acts or courses of conduct 
or his possession of a particular disposition or of benign mental and moral traits; nor can he testify that 
his own acquaintance, observation, and knowledge of Defendant leads to his own independent opinion 
that Defendant possesses a good general or specific character, inconsistent with commission of acts 
charged. The witness is, however, allowed to summarize what he has heard in the community, although 
much of it may have been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself. The evidence which the 
law permits is not as to the personality of Defendant but only as to the shadow his daily life has cast in 
his neighborhood.”). 
 57. For example, Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-404 provides that character evidence “is not 
admissible to prove that the person acted in accordance with the character or trait on a particular occasion,” 
and Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-403 prohibits evidence that is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice.”  See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (1997) (“evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of his or her character . . .  [is] inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified 
occasion.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (1997) (“the court in its discretion may exclude evidence if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability of undue prejudice.”). The New York 
Rules of Evidence are a mix of statutory and case law, but case law holds that character evidence is 
inadmissible for the propensity inference. See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901). New 
York also requires that the evidence not only be probative of the crime charged, but also that the “probative 
value outweighs its potential for prejudice” People v. Ely, 503 N.E.2d 88, 94 (N.Y. 1986).  In Illinois, 
“[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” ILL. R. EVID. 404 (2011). Further, Illinois 
requires a balancing test: “relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” ILL. R. EVID. 403 (2011). 
 58. People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 186 (Cal. 1999) (“propensity” evidence is per 
se unduly prejudicial to the defense”); People v. Walston, 900 N.E.2d 267, 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“It is 
not the timing but the nature and quantity of the propensity evidence that can render it unfairly 
prejudicial.”). 
 59. Falsetta, 986 P.2d at 186; Walston, 900 N.E.2d at 287.  
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the relevance to the type of crime charged.60 The Defendant is generally 
allowed to introduce relevant character evidence.61 Relevance is 
dependent on whether the evidence makes it more or less likely that the 
Defendant committed the crime charged.62  
The State, however, is generally prohibited from introducing character 
evidence, except to rebut the Defendant’s introduction.63 Courts’ 
 
 60. Brennan, supra note 54, at 38 (“Only when a criminal Defendant volunteers his own reputation 
for a character trait will the prosecution be able to introduce contrary reputation evidence in rebuttal . . . 
Pertinent character traits are dictated by the underlying criminal charge. For example, in a trial for murder 
or any crime of violence, the Defendant may introduce evidence of his own peaceable character, but 
should not be allowed to introduce evidence of his honesty or chastity”); see also MD. R. EVID. 5-404 
(“An accused may offer evidence of the accused's pertinent trait of character. If the evidence is admitted, 
the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut it.”) (emphasis added); MD. R. EVID. 5-404(2) (“The accused 
may offer evidence as to his good character with regard to the character trait relevant to the commission 
or noncommission of the crime charged, for the purpose of showing that he did not commit the offense.”); 
21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law: Trial § 517 (2019) (“[I]n criminal cases, the prosecution is prohibited 
from introducing evidence of a Defendant's bad character or reputation in order to prove the Defendant 
acted in conformity with that character in committing the charged offense.”). 
 61. Sahin v. State, 653 A.2d 452, 455 (1995) (noting that “[the Defendant’s] first contention is 
based on the well-established doctrine that a criminal Defendant may always offer evidence of his or her 
good character for a trait relevant to the crime charged as circumstantial evidence of innocence.”); Braxton 
v. State, 274 A.2d 647, 649 (1971) (“a Defendant may always offer evidence of his good character and to 
prove that his character was such as to make it unlikely that he would have committed the act charged 
against him.”); People v. Singmouangthong, 778 N.E.2d 390, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“Generally, 
a Defendant may introduce evidence of his or her good character insofar as it relates to a particular 
character trait pertinent to the charged offense.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1102 (2019) (allows for the 
Defendant to introduce character evidence “to prove his conduct in conformity with such character or trait 
of character.”). 
 62. Braxton, 274 A.2d at 650 (“To be relevant, it is necessary that the character be confined to an 
attribute or trait the existence or nonexistence of which would be involved in the noncommission or 
commission of the particular crime charged. This, of course, depends upon the moral wrong involved in 
the commission of the crime charged.”). Common examples are the Defendant’s introduction of the 
character trait of “peacefulness” or non-violence is relevant to making it less or more likely that the 
Defendant acted in self-defense, and thus, relevant to the Defendant’s guilt of the crime. See Williams v. 
State, 179 A.3d 1006, 1010 (2018) (involving an assault case where the Defendant called a character 
witness who testified to him being “a peaceful person, and that she had never seen him become violent or 
with a firearm,” thus, allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior assault to rebut the evidence). In 
theft cases, the character trait of “veracity” or “truthfulness” are considered relevant. See People v. 
Huffman, No. C053739, 2008 WL 762263, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2008) (“Moreover, his 
convictions-for forgery, perjury, and grand theft-were all extremely relevant to truthfulness, where 
Defendant testified.”). 
 63. 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law: Trial § 517 (2019) (“in criminal cases, the prosecution is 
prohibited from introducing evidence of a Defendant's bad character or reputation in order to prove the 
Defendant acted in conformity with that character in committing the charged offense.”); see also People 
v. Randle, 498 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“character evidence offered by the prosecution to 
show the accused's propensity to violence is generally inadmissible because the danger of unfair prejudice 
to the Defendant in being portrayed as a “bad man” substantially outweighs the probative value of the 
evidence.”); People v. Megown, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 911, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), as modified (Oct. 12, 
2018) (“Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a propensity or disposition to engage in 
a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person's conduct on a specified occasion.”); People 
v. Villatoro, 281 P.3d 390, 394 (Cal. 2012) (“Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a 
propensity or disposition to engage in a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person's 
conduct on a specified occasion.”).  
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reluctance to allow the State to introduce character evidence stems from 
three primary concerns.  First, there is the concern that the jury will 
convict the Defendant, not for the crime charged, but simply because the 
jurors believe the Defendant is a bad person.64 Second, jurors have a 
tendency to give character evidence excessive weight and infer that the 
Defendant committed the crime due to a criminal propensity, rather than 
the evidence presented.65  Third, character evidence can confuse or 
distract the jury.66 
In cases brought under state gang statutes, the Defendant does not have 
to affirmatively present any character evidence for the State to “rebut”; 
rather the State can introduce character evidence sua sponte. The 
introduction of the evidence is done, as in KJ’s case, under the guise that 
the State must prove that the Defendant is a gang member for the jury to 
find the Defendant guilty of gang conspiracy.67  
The introduction of character evidence disturbs constitutional 
principles when it violates a Defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. 
A Defendant’s right to a fair trial is made applicable to the State through 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.68 A trial is 
fundamentally unfair where the introduction of the evidence “offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”69  The right to a fair trial invokes 
 
 64. People v. Lindgren, 402 N.E.2d 238, 242 (Ill. 1980) (“Such evidence over persuades the jury, 
which might convict the Defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment.”); 
Randle, 498 N.E.2d at 736 (“character evidence offered by the prosecution to show the accused's 
propensity to violence is generally inadmissible because the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant 
in being portrayed as a ‘bad man’ substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”); Megown, 
238 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 921 (“Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a propensity or 
disposition to engage in a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person's conduct on a 
specified occasion.”); Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (“the risk that a jury will 
convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a 
bad person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.”). 
 65. People v. Williams, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (“It is objectionable, not 
because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much. The natural and inevitable 
tendency of the tribunal—whether judge or jury—is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of 
crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof 
of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 66. Id. (“may result in confusion of issues and require extended collateral inquiry.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 366 P.3d 680, 687 (Nev. 2015) (noting that gang evidence is 
“generally not” admissible but for the gang enhancement statute); MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. LAW § 9-
804(a)(1) (2019) (requiring the Defendant to participate in a criminal gang for the statute to be applicable). 
 68. Crawford v. State, 404 A.2d 244, 254 (Md. 1979) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process [guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution]”) 
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, (1955)); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (“The 
failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process  . . . A fair 
trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 69. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992). 
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both procedural and substantive due process concerns. 70  
For character evidence to render a trial “fundamentally unfair," the 
evidence must both be of “such quality as necessarily prevents a fair 
trial”71 and offer the fact finder “no permissible inferences.”72  A 
Defendant’s right to a fair trial is absolute.73  A Defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to a fact finder’s finding of guilt – not on 
character – but on the admissible evidence.74 A Defendant, “[n]o matter 
how vile or despicable [] [they] may appear to be” has a right to “a fair 
trial.”75 A fair trial means “that individuals may only be convicted for the 
crimes with which they are charged and proven; they may not be subject 
to criminal conviction merely because they have a detestable or abhorrent 
background.”76 
Consequently, the rationale that supports the general inadmissibility of 
propensity evidence is simple—character evidence that might be 
“logically persuasive,”77 as is the case where an individual is charged with 
a crime and has a lengthy criminal history, has the ability to “over 
persuade”78 the jury.  Evidence leading the jury to find guilt not based on 
the evidence of the alleged crime, but on the belief that the Defendant 
committed the crime simply because of past behavior,79 is correctly 
impermissible in court proceedings. Because a Defendant has a 
 
 70. Procedural due process refers to the “procedure” the State uses to “execute, imprison, or fine 
a Defendant” and must entail “appropriate procedural safeguards.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 
338 (1986). Substantive due process refers to constitutional rights the Defendant maintains, related to life, 
liberty and property, that the State may not deprive, regardless of the procedure used. County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (“Our prior cases have held the provision that ‘[n]o State 
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’ to ‘guarante[e] more 
than fair process . . . as well, “barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them.”’”) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV). 
 71. Despite the right to a fair trial, there is “no specific decision [that] defines fairness.” Sarah 
Bernstein, Fourteenth Amendment—Police Failure to Preserve Evidence and Erosion Of The Due Process 
Right To A Fair Trial, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1256, 1266 (1989-90).  
 72. People v. Albarran, 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 73. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (“The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing 
violates even the minimal standards of due process . . . [a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement 
of due process.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 74. State v. Moeller, 548 N.W.2d 465, 468 (S.D. 1996) (finding reversible error where Defendant 
charged with sexual assault had three prior incidents of sexual assault introduced). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
77.  Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).  In Michelson the Defendant was 
charged with bribery of a federal agent and presented five witnesses to attest to his reputation for 
truthfulness.  The Court explained that even though character evidence may go to identity of the client in 
stating that “such facts might logically be persuasive that [the Defendant] is by propensity a probable 
perpetrator of the crime,” character evidence has the ability to “weigh too much with the jury and to so 
over-persuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend 
against a particular charge.” Id. 
          78.   Id. 
    79. Id. 
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constitutional right to a fair trial, a jury verdict based on perceived 
character rather than admissible evidence violates the constitutional 
guarantee “that a Defendant is tried upon the crime charged and is not 
tried upon an antisocial history.80 Consequently, the fact that state gang 
statutes permit prosecutors to enter character evidence when otherwise 
not permitted by the evidentiary rules is a direct contradiction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process guarantees to criminal 
Defendants. 
 B. Gang Evidence As Character Evidence  
“Black Guerilla Family has its own leadership, its own rules, its own 
structure. Its purpose is control over its community. How it achieves that 
goal -- how the Black Guerilla Family or BGF, as it's referred to, achieve[s] 
that goal is through violence, through intimidation, through drug sales. 
Now, this action in that community is like a cancer affecting all the 
residents in that vicinity around the Greenmount cemetery . . . If the Black 
Guerilla Family members…, feel that you are cooperating with the police, 
if they feel that you' re speaking out against them, if they have any riff 
within their own organization, their solution is simple. Their solution is a 
bullet. The result is death, disfigurement, and injury.”81  
The prosecutor’s words in KJ’s case exemplify the intended purpose of 
prosecuting criminal Defendants using gang statutes while 
simultaneously combining substantive criminal charges with the gang 
allegation in one trial.  Prosecutors essentially intertwine the character of 
the gang into the character of the criminal Defendant.  This section 
explores the use of character evidence in the context of gang statutes and 
more specifically, the character traits of the organization imputed on the 
Defendant when gang evidence is introduced.  This section argues that 
gang evidence is unduly prejudicial and bad character evidence of not 
only the Defendant, but the organization and all of the racist lore of gangs.  
The prosecutor’s words in KJ’s trial linked KJ’s character with the 
character, nature, and history of the BGF.  The prosecutor argues that 
“The Black Guerilla Family . . . achieve[s] [its] goal . . . through violence, 
through intimidation, through drug sales,” but the BGF was not on trial 
for charges of robbery, drug dealing and murder—KJ was the criminal 
Defendant.  State gang statutes thus, serve as an impermissible conduit 
for gang evidence: “In general, where a gang enhancement is alleged, [] 
 
 80. Id.; see also People v. Nicolas, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 476 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), review 
denied 2017 Cal. LEXIS 4377 (Cal. June 14, 2017) (“The purpose of this evidentiary rule “is to assure 
that a Defendant is tried upon the crime charged and is not tried upon an antisocial history.”). 
 81. Tr., State of Maryland v. KJ, No. 113310058, 65 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2016).  
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the culture, habits, and psychology of gangs [] [becomes] permissible”82 
to prove the existence of the organization. 
Courts have unequivocally found that gang evidence is prejudicial 
character evidence83 but routinely admit the use of this prejudicial 
character evidence either for motive84 or because of the relevance to State 
gang statutes’ requirement to prove the Defendant was an actual 
member.85 
C. Societal Views of Gangs 
Despite research showing a reduction in gang violence,86 legislators, 
prosecutors, juries, and the general public have an intense fear of gangs.87 
This fear is relevant in discussing and understanding the unduly 
prejudicial effect of gang evidence.  Former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions prioritized the prosecution of gangs and increased funding for 
gang prosecution88 with no empirical support that such focus and funding 
was necessary.89  While the priorities of Former Attorney General 
Sessions are not necessarily representative of public opinion, his message, 
along with the rhetoric of President Trump, reached a broad audience. 
Media coverage also contributes to this anti-gang narrative.   In the media, 
gangs are presented “as an alien presence or an invading force” and this 
perception “dominates high profile news accounts even in the face of 
 
 82. Eisen, supra note 38, at 2 (quoting People v. Valdez, 58 Cal. App. 4th 494, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997). 
 83. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (Md. 2011) (holding that “we remain ever-cognizant 
of the highly incendiary nature of gang evidence and the possibility that a jury may determine guilt by 
association rather than by its belief that the Defendant committed the criminal acts,” but that the 
Defendant’s membership in MS-13 was more relevant to the motive of the murder than prejudicial); State 
v. Torrez, 210 P.3d 228, 235 (N.M. 2009) (stating that “to be sure, evidence of gang affiliation could be 
used improperly as a backdoor means of introducing character evidence by associating the Defendant with 
the gang and describing the gang's bad act” but concluding that “Defendant does not dispute that the 
expert's testimony was offered to rebut his claim of self-defense, and therefore went to his motive for 
shooting at the house” and thus, the “expert’s testimony was not impermissible”); People v. Olguin, 37 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that while Defendants' gang membership and 
their gang activities was prejudicial to a certain degree, the evidence was highly relevant to the 
prosecution's theory of how and why the victim was killed).  
 84. See Gutierrez, 32 A.3d at 13; Torrez, 210 P.3d at 235; Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. 
 85. Gonzalez v. State, 366 P.3d 680, 687 (Nev. 2015) (noting that gang evidence is “generally not” 
admissible, but for, the gang enhancement in Nevada). 
 86. See supra Section II (A). 
 87. Supra Section II (A). 
 88. Andrea Noble, Sessions Unleashed Organized Crime Task Force On MS-13, WASHINGTON 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2017, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/23/ms-13-doj-organized-crime-
task-force-target/ (“Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced Monday that he’s designated the MS-13 
street gang as a priority for the Justice Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces — 
enabling authorities to target the gang with broader array of federal resources.”). 
 89. Supra Section II (A) (discussing decrease in crime rate). 
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contradictory evidence.”90   
In KJ’s case, prosecutors referred to the gang as a “cancer” that used 
“violence” to engulf the Greenmount area and used his alleged gang name 
“Slay” to invoke an image of KJ as a dangerous menace to society.91  
“Once a negative stereotype like gang member is activated, people often 
seek information that further supports the instilled perspective.”92  It 
worked in KJ’s case and it works in courtrooms across the country. Jurors 
are more likely to find a Defendant guilty because of the overwhelming 
effect of gang membership, which leads jurors to convict criminal 
Defendant’s not due to the facts of the case, but rather because of bad 
character traits attributed to the gang and its members.93 
D. Propensity Evidence is Substantially Prejudicial  
This Article does not call for the complete exclusion of gang evidence, 
where relevant and admissible, but rather a separation of gang evidence 
that is substantially prejudicial and prevents fair criminal trials.  Despite 
the disproportionate fear of gangs, courts have recognized94 the immense 
and sincere fear held by the public of gangs95 to be real. Using this 
 
 90. Mayer, supra note 39, at 954 (“the media treats gangs and their presence or absence in a 
community as a fact apart from the people of the local community, something akin to a disease or a 
military attack.  This perception of gangs as an alien presence or an invading force dominates high profile 
news accounts even in the face of contradictory evidence.”). 
           91. Kevin Rector, BGF Gang Hitman Sentenced to Life Behind Bars in 2013 Killing, Conspiracy, 
BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 23, 2016, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-kj-
sentence-20160823-story.html. 
 92. Eisen, supra note 38, at 2 (quoting People v. Valdez, 58 Cal. App. 4th 494, 506 (1997)).  
 93. See Eisen, supra note 38, at 2 (finding that the introduction of gang evidence increases the 
likelihood of jurors finding Defendants guilty).  
 94. That societal reactions can influence court perceptions, findings, and holdings is not unusual 
or unique to gangs but is rather a recognized phenomenon; court decisions do not happen in a vacuum and 
are directly impacted by societal reactions. See Alana Miles, Overrepresentation in Special Education: 
Does the Idea Violate the Equal Protection Clause?, 17 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 245, 265 n. 99 (2016) 
(discussing the “doll test,” where a majority of African American children in a study preferred the white 
doll). Justice Scalia specifically addressed the societal concerns of domestic violence but ultimately 
rejected the application. Washington v. Davis, 547 U.S. 813, 832–33 (2006) (“Respondents in both cases, 
joined by a number of their amici, contend that the nature of the offenses charged in these two cases—
domestic violence—requires greater flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence. This particular type of 
crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify 
at trial.”). 
 95. For example, in Dawson v. Delaware, the Supreme Court addressed the use gang membership 
as character evidence when the Defendant’s gang membership to the Aryan nation was used during 
sentencing. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992). The State and Defense stipulated to the terms 
that “[t]he Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960s in California in 
response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood 
now exist in many state prisons including Delaware.” Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that State 
used the evidence of the gang membership “simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally 
reprehensible.” Id.; see also Gonzalez v. State, 366 P.3d 680, 687 (Nev. 2015) (“This, among other highly 
prejudicial evidence used to prove the existence of a criminal gang evidence, is a type of evidence that 
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reasoning, courts have acknowledged that gang evidence can lead to 
improper propensity reasoning.96 Merely mentioning a gang association 
operates similar to Rule 404(b) evidence, which allows evidence of prior 
bad acts to be admitted for any purpose other than propensity.97 Admitting 
this evidence using Rule 404(b), however, “implie[s] the Defendant [has] 
a history of criminal behavior, leading the jurors to think it more likely 
that the Defendant committed the act in question.”98 
Propensity reasoning in gang cases is an effective method used by 
prosecutors to secure a guilty verdict. There are various ways in which 
prosecutors use propensity reasoning. 
First, the State is allowed to admit evidence of the gang’s criminal 
activity, activity which might not even overlap with the Defendant’s 
substantive offense, in order to prove that the Defendant belongs to a 
statutorily defined criminal gang.99  In KJ’s case, the State was permitted 
to admit evidence of BGF’s illegal activities to prove that BGF was a 
“gang” under the State statute’s definition.100 Notwithstanding the fact 
that KJ was never alleged to have engaged in drug selling, was never 
alleged to hold a position within the gang that involved the facilitation of 
weapons to gang members,101 and was not alleged to have been involved 
in the multiple unrelated murders alleged to have been carried out by 
BGF, the prosecutor was able to introduce unrelated evidence to lead the 
jury to a guilty verdict.   When this unrelated evidence is introduced, it 
“overwhelms” juries with traits such as criminality, dangerousness, and 
 
would generally not be admissible during a guilt phase of a trial but is statutorily admissible in order to 
prove a gang enhancement.”). 
96. United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2013). 
97. Unites States v. Hamilton, 723 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2013) (Trial court abused its discretion under 
FRE 404b(b) by admitting evidence of Defendant’s gang affiliation as “other act” because it was 
considered extrinsic testimony unrelated to fact for a felon in possession of a firearm).   However, “Trial 
courts must treat evidence of gang affiliation with care since most jurors are likely to look unfavorably 
upon a Defendant's membership in a street gang.” United States v. Tolbert, 8 F. App’x. 372, 378 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
98. Eisen, supra note 38, at 2. 
99. Gonzalez, 366 P.3d at 687 (“This, among other highly prejudicial evidence used to prove the 
existence of a criminal gang evidence, is a type of evidence that would generally not be admissible during 
a guilt phase of a trial but is statutorily admissible in order to prove a gang enhancement.”);  People v. 
Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Cal. 2004) (“In order to prove the elements of the criminal street gang 
enhancement, the prosecution may, as in this case, present expert testimony on criminal street gangs.”). 
 100. Md. Criminal Law Section 9-804 criminalizes participation in gangs that engage in a “pattern 
of criminal activity.” Such an element allows the State to introduce evidence of the gang’s general criminal 
activity.  See also Burris v. State, 78 A.3d 371, 373–74 (Md. Ct. App. 2013) (allowing the State to 
introduce evidence of unrelated murders through a “Sergeant Dennis Workley of the Baltimore City Police 
Department, proffered as a gang expert, who [] identif[ied] Burris as a member of BGF, and testify that 
BGF was a ‘violent’ gang that would commit murder on the basis of a debt owed to one of its members.”). 
 101. BGF was alleged to have a “sergeant in arms” who facilitated the movement of weapons. KJ 
was never alleged to hold this position. Tr., State of Maryland v. KJ, No. 113310058, 38 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
June 3, 2016). 
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deviance that is attributed to the gang and, vicariously, the Defendant, 
often leading to a guilty verdict. 
 Second, the evidence of the gang activity forces the jury to view the 
Defendant “only as a dangerous member of a dangerous group, one who 
is certainly capable (and quite possibly guilty) of committing any of the 
criminal activities and antisocial behaviors ascribed to the organization—
not least of all the particular crime[s] charged.”102  In other words, once 
labeled as a “gang member,” the Defendant is no longer seen as the 
“individual Defendant” but rather as mere conduit or proxy of the gang’s 
criminal activity.  After evidence of the gang’s criminal activity is 
introduced, the jury is left to believe that the Defendant comports with 
that behavior.103  
KJ was found not guilty of the substantive criminal charge of firearm 
use in a crime of violence, but was convicted of the underlying crime of 
violence, the murder.104 Unduly prejudicial gang evidence gave the jury a 
means of finding KJ guilty of the murder, but not guilty for the firearm 
that was used to commit that murder.  
  Third, once this unduly prejudicial gang evidence is successfully 
presented to the jury, the State is no longer required to prosecute the 
“individual Defendant” but is allowed to use the Defendant as proxy of 
the gang’s bad character traits. By allowing the Defendant and the gang 
to become one in the same, the State is relieved of the burden of proving 
the substantive offense and are able to rest their conviction on the 
propensity reasoning created.105   
 
E.  Gang Evidence as a Violation of Due Process:  
People v. Albarran 
 
In People v. Albarran, the California Court of Appeals held that the 
 
 102. United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2013) (Holloway, J., dissenting) 
(finding a violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because of the unduly prejudicial nature of the 
admission of a police officer referred to as a “gang expert”). 
 103. Id.  
 104. After the juror’s verdict, defense objected. The trial court ruled that the finding was merely 
factually inconsistent, and that the conviction stood. Tr., State of Maryland v. KJ, No. 113310058, 22-23 
(Md. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2016). See also Teixeira v. State of Maryland, 75 A.3d 371 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2013) (explaining that factually inconsistent verdicts are permissible but not legally inconsistent). 
Specifically, the court stated it was possible that the jury thought K.J. “was a participant [in the murder], 
but not convinced that he actually fired the handgun,” notwithstanding the only testimony was the KJ was 
the actual shooter. Tr., State of Maryland v. KJ, No. 113310058, 1-9 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2016). 
 105. See Eisen, supra note 38, at 17 (finding “that introducing gang evidence at trial can have a 
significant prejudicial effect on juror decisions as to the Defendant’s guilt or innocence.  Taken together, 
[] data show that informing a jury that the Defendant is a gang member significantly increases the 
likelihood of a guilty verdict.  Further . . ., when a gang expert is called to inform the jury that the 
Defendant is a member of a dangerous criminal street gang . . ., a significant minority of jurors will vote 
to convict even when reasonable doubt has been clearly established.”). 
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introduction of gang evidence rendered the case fundamentally unfair and 
reversed the Defendant’s conviction.106 Albarran, is instructive in 
showing: (a) how gang evidence can serve as character evidence, (b) how 
fact finders prejudicially interpret the character evidence, and (c) how the 
prejudicial effect then results in a deprivation of fundamental fairness and 
a violation of due process.   
1. Albarran: The Facts  
In Albarran, the Defendant was accused of shooting a firearm at an 
occupied  home.107 When the homeowner looked out of the window, he 
saw what he described as two Hispanic males with guns.108  One of those 
men was later identified as Albarran, a suspected member of the 13 Kings 
gang.109 Despite the fact that the suspect never self-identified as a gang 
member,110 the prosecutor charged the Defendant with the California 
gang enhancement statute. The prosecutor argued that the crime 
“presented a ‘classic’ gang shooting and that the entire purpose of the 
shooting was to gain respect and enhance the shooters' reputations within 
the gang community, and to intimidate the neighborhood.”111 
During trial, the People112 called a Sheriff’s Deputy as a gang expert.  
The Deputy testified about the Defendant’s alleged113 gang tattoos, 
alleged gang graffiti around the Defendant’s home that “contained a 
specific threat to murder police officers,”114 and the alleged criminal 
activity in which the gang engaged.115 In regards to the gang’s criminal 
activity, the Deputy testified that the gang engaged in “criminal offenses, 
including robberies, drive-by shootings, carjacking, and felony 
vandalism.” Lastly, the Deputy testified that gang members “gain respect 
by committing crimes and intimidating people.”116  
 
106.  People v. Albarran, 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 217-20. 
 110. Id. at 221 (“there was no evidence in this case that any of the shooters had made themselves 
known—the shooters made no announcements, did not throw any gang signs and there was no graffiti 
referring to the crime.”). 
 111. Id. at 219. 
 112. In California, the State prosecutes cases as “The People.”  
 113. The Sheriff Deputy’s testimony is framed as alleged gang tattoos, graffiti and crimes, because 
the gang statute does not require that the allegation of gang involvement be previously proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or test in an unbiased way in order to be admissible in court.   
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 230. 
         116. Id. at 227 (“Yet this shooting presented no signs of gang member's efforts in that regard —
there was no evidence the shooters announced their presence or purpose—before, during or after the 
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The Defendant was found guilty.117  On appeal, the Defendant argued 
that the gang evidence was inadmissible, and its admission had rendered 
his trial fundamentally unfair.118  
 
2. Albarran: Gang Evidence as a Proxy of Defendant’s Character 
  
In Albarran, the prosecutor meticulously used the previously described 
gang evidence to construct a proxy for the Defendant’s character by using 
it as character evidence, thereby allowing the jury to engage in a series of 
otherwise impermissible “inferences.”119  The inferences included that the 
Defendant was “dangerous,” just as the gang was; that the Defendant had 
a “motive,” just as the gang had; and ultimately that the Defendant had a 
general disposition towards crime, just as the gang did. It is worthwhile 
to discuss each inference and why each one violated Albarran’s 
constitutional rights.  
First, the prosecutor was able to define the Defendant as “dangerous” 
because the gang was dangerous. Specifically, the prosecutor referred to 
the gang as “dangerous” and told the jurors “not to be fooled” by the 
Defendant’s “altar boy” appearance, because he was “an active member 
of the 13 Kings with gang tattoos.”120  Moreover, the prosecutor was 
allowed to illustrate how dangerous the gang was by presenting evidence 
of gang graffiti that surrounded the Defendant’s house, graffiti that 
“contained a specific threat to murder police officers.”121  The prosecutor 
also argued that the Defendant’s tattoos showed an allegiance to the 
Mexican Mafia, “a violent prison street gang.”122  Basically, the 
prosecutor used the gang’s “dangerous[ness]” to argue an inference to the 
jury that because the gang was dangerous—so dangerous that it threated 
to kill police and was connected to the “violent” Mexican Mafia—the 
Defendant was therefore also a danger to the community. 
Second, the prosecutor used the gang’s motive of “gain[ing] respect by 
committing crimes and intimidating people” as defining the Defendant’s 
 
shooting. There was no evidence presented that any gang members had ‘bragged’ about their involvement 
or created graffiti and took credit for it.”). 
117.  Id. at 222. 
118.  Id.  
 119. Id. at 232. 
 120. Id.; Id. at 231, n. 17 (discussing the standard applied to determining the prejudicial nature of 
the evidence stating, “the admission of the evidence was so prejudicial as to render the Defendant's trial 
fundamentally unfair.”). 
 121. Id. at 220. 
 122. Id. at 228 (“[the prosecutor] described a specific threat 13 Kings had made in their graffiti to 
kill police officers. The jury heard references to the Mexican Mafia both during the prosecutor's opening 
argument and in Deputy Gillis's testimony. All of this evidence was irrelevant to the underlying charges 
and obviously prejudicial.”). 
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motive.123 The fact that “there was no evidence the shooters announced 
their presence or purpose—before, during or after the shooting” did not 
matter according to the prosecutor because the Defendant shared the 
gang’s the need for respect.124 According to the prosecutor, “the motive 
for the shooting was to gain respect and enhance the shooter's reputation 
—essentially to “earn one's bones” within the gang (i.e., the “respect” 
motive).125 Just like the use of the “dangerous[ness]” of the gang, the 
prosecutor likewise urged the inference that because the gang wanted to 
“gain respect” through the commission of crimes, the Defendant shared a 
motive of “gain[ing] respect” through the commission of the alleged 
crime.  
Ultimately, the prosecutor’s use of these inferences made the 
Defendant’s actions inseparable from those of the gang. The sum of these 
inferences was the Defendant as a member, shared the bad character of 
the gang.  As the appellate court concluded,  
The paramount function of [the] evidence was to show Albarran's criminal 
disposition— a fact emphasized in the prosecutor's closing argument when 
he argued: “[Albarran] is all about being a gang member day in and day 
out, every day, every night, despite efforts of the deputies . . . He's all about 
it.”126 
Because the Defendant was “all about being a gang member day in and 
day out, every day, every night,” the following inferences became logical: 
if the gang had a criminal disposition, so too did the Defendant; if the 
gang had a motive of gaining respect, so too did the Defendant; and if the 
gang was dangerous, so too was the Defendant. After all, if the Defendant 
is “all about it,” as a member, then he is “all about” the bad character of 
the gang. This series of inferences is the bedrock of the due process 
violations committed against Albarran, KJ, and countless other criminal 
Defendants charged under state gang statutes. 
3. Albrarran: From Impermissible Inference to Due Process Violation 
The appellate court’s analysis in Albrarran illustrates how gang 
evidence becomes the Defendant’s character evidence through the fact 
finder’s use of a series of inferences that the Defendant, as a gang 
member, shares the same bad attributes as the gang itself.  Using the 
reasons described in this section, the Appellate Court in Albarran held 
that these inferences rendered the trial “fundamentally unfair” because the 
 
        123. Id. at 221. 
    124. Id. at 227. 
 125. Id. at 227.  
 126. Id. at 228. 
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evidence was unduly prejudicial.127  
First, the Appellate Court in Albarran found that there were no 
permissible inferences that gang evidence could serve in the trial and 
therefore the gang evidence was inadmissible.128 The court rationalized 
this conclusion, stating that “[o]nly if there are no permissible inferences 
the jury may draw from the evidence can [the] admission violate due 
process.”129  The prosecutor in Albarran argued, as many prosecutors 
around the country do, that the gang evidence was relevant for motive and 
intent.130 The court rejected the People’s position because there was no 
evidence that the shooting was gang motivated131 and therefore there were 
no permissible inferences for the jury to draw.132  
  The Albarran court held that the evidence was “so prejudicial” 
because the inferences allowed the jury to find the Defendant guilty using 
his perceived character rather than real evidence.133   A Defendant’s right 
to a fair trial includes the right to have guilt determined and premised on 
the commission of the crime, not his character.134  Thus, to allow the jury 
to find a Defendant guilty because of his character rather than the actual 
commission of the crime deprives the Defendant of a fair trial.135 
In reaching its conclusion, the Albarran court’s rationale was twofold.  
First, the court believed that gang evidence, even if it is the sole evidence, 
is prejudicial to the Defendant because society views gangs as 
dangerous—“the word ‘gang’ . . . connotes opprobrious implications . . . 
[T]he word ‘gang’ takes on a sinister meaning when it is associated with 
activities.”136  Second, the court noted that such “sinister” evidence and 
resulting use of inferences is so prejudicial that the inferences can “cloud” 
the jury’s judgment of the Defendant. As the court in Albarran noted, this 
presents “a real danger that the jury would improperly infer that whether 
or not Albarran was involved in these shootings, he had committed other 
crimes, would commit crimes in the future, and posed a danger to the 
 
 127. Id. at 232. 
128.   Id. at 217. 
 129. Id. at 229. 
 130. Id. at 232. 
         131. Id. at 227 (“Yet this shooting presented no signs of gang member's efforts in that regard —
there was no evidence the shooters announced their presence or purpose—before, during or after the 
shooting. There was no evidence presented that any gang members had ‘bragged’ about their involvement 
or created graffiti and took credit for it.”). 
 132. Id. at 230. 
         133. Id. at 236. 
 134. Id. at 230 (“there was a real danger that the jury would improperly infer that whether or not 
Albarran was involved in these shootings, he had committed other crimes, would commit crimes in the 
future, and posed a danger to the police and society in general and thus he should be punished.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 135. Id. at 232. 
 136. Id. at 223 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
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police and society in general and thus he should be punished.”137 
Similar to the court in Albarran, several courts have agreed that gang 
evidence, alone, is prejudicial because of the societal beliefs and feelings 
that gangs are inherently criminal.138 Thus, when gang evidence is 
admitted, it renders the trial fundamentally unfair because the gang 
evidence creates impermissible inferences that allow the jurors to find the 
Defendant guilty because his perceived character flaws highlighted by the 
gang evidence.139  Using this reasoning, the Albarran court found that the 
Defendant’s trial was “fundamentally unfair.”140  
People v. Albarran is not the only case that has discussed the ability 
for gang evidence to be used as a proxy to impute character evidence onto 
a criminal Defendant, thus violating a Defendant’s due process rights. In 
some respects, the fact pattern in Albarran makes the idea of undue 
prejudice easy to follow where the underlying crime in Albarran was not 
factually proven to be gang related. But, in other cases such as United 
States v. Archuleta and Dawson v. Delaware, courts have discussed the 
ability for gang evidence to become unduly prejudicial evidence, even 
where the Defendant alleged crime may be motivated by gang 
membership.   
In Archuleta,141 the Defendant was charged with conspiracy after 
participating in drug smuggling with one other alleged gang member and 
two non-gang members.142 As part of the State’s case, the State called a 
gang expert to testify to the practices of the gang and argued that the 
testimony established the conspiracy.143 The dissent in Archuleta, 
however, argued that the gang evidence was unduly prejudicial and “had 
much to do with creating an aura of fear and mistrust around Mr. 
Archuleta—not Mr. Archuleta the individual Defendant, but Mr. 
Archuleta the [gang member]. A police officer, in effect, told the jury over 
and over that the [gang] w[as] evil men who did evil things.”144 Such 
testimony, the dissent argued, would cause the fact-finder to engage in 
propensity reasoning.  In rejecting that the introduction of gang evidence 
was appropriate in this case, the dissent argued that “the great risk of such 
testimony is that, in the eyes of the jurors, Mr. Archuleta  . . . would be 
viewed only as a dangerous member of a dangerous group, one who is 
certainly capable (and quite possibly guilty) of committing any of the 
 
 137. Id. at 230. 
 138. Id. at 231. 
 139. Id. at 232. 
 140. Id. at 230-32. 
 141. United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 142. Id. at 1291-92. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 1300 (Holloway, J. dissenting). 
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criminal activities and antisocial behaviors ascribed to the organization—
not least of all the particular crime charged.”145  
Even the Supreme Court also considers the use of gang membership to 
constitute propensity evidence.146 In Dawson, the Defendant’s gang 
membership to the Aryan Brotherhood was used during sentencing as a 
sentence-increasing factor.147 The State and defense stipulated148 that 
“[t]he Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began 
in the 1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. 
Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in 
many state prisons including Delaware.”149  The Supreme Court found 
that the State used the evidence of the Defendant’s gang membership 
“simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally 
reprehensible.”150 The Supreme Court’s Dawson ruling is notable in that 
the “morally reprehensible” stigma stemmed from the practices and 
beliefs of the gang—i.e. the Defendant’s personal beliefs and feelings 
were considered to be the same as those held by the Aryan Brotherhood. 
But, like the gang evidence in Archuleta and Albarran, the gang evidence 
introduced in Dawson lead the jury to impute the “morally reprehensible” 
beliefs of the gang onto the Defendant. According to the United States 
Supreme Court, the “morally reprehensible” character the gang placed 
onto to the Defendant was prejudicial enough to violate the Defendant’s 
due process rights.151 
F. Due Process 
The concern of over-persuading the jury with bad character evidence 
is precisely why propensity evidence is generally inadmissible and why 
such evidence should not be admitted in gang cases.  The Supreme Court 
explained in Michelson that character evidence is inadmissible due to its 
ability to “over-persuade the jury,” and thus, deprive the Defendant of a 
fair trial.152 In Michelson the Defendant was charged with bribery of a 
 
 145. Id.  
 146. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992). Interestingly enough, several cases, including 
Dawson, have shown a greater concern for the constitutional rights of white Defendants in ensuring to 
preserve the rights of Defendants belonging to predominately white gangs. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 
366 P.3d 680, 688 (Nev. 2015).  
 147. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 167 (1992). 
 148. Id. at 161-62 (“During sentencing of the Defendant the State intended to introduce ‘expert 
testimony regarding origin and nature of the Aryan Brotherhood’ and ‘photographs of multiple swastika 
tattoos on Dawson's back and a picture of a swastika he  had painted  on the wall of his prison cell.’”). 
 149. Id. at 162 (internal citation omitted).  
 150. Id. at 167.  
 151. Id. at 159. 
 152. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). 
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federal agent and presented five witnesses to attest to the Defendant’s 
reputation for truthfulness.153 Michelson argued that when character 
evidence is introduced, “such facts might logically be persuasive that [the 
Defendant] is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime.” 
Character evidence, Michelson continues, has the ability to “weigh too 
much with the jury and to so over-persuade them as to prejudge one with 
a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a 
particular charge.”154   
Michelson’s concerns of overwhelming the jury is even more important 
in the context of gang evidence, where the evidence lends itself to 
propensity reasoning as discussed in Archuleta, Dawson and 
demonstrated in KJ’s case. In all of these cases, the jury seemed to 
conclude that because the gang is criminal, the Defendant, a member of 
the gang, is a criminal as well. Like in Archuleta, Albarran, and Dawson, 
in KJ’s case, the gang evidence created in the eyes of the jurors not KJ, 
the “individual Defendant,” but instead KJ, the BGF member. Because 
BGF was notoriously violent, dangerous, and criminal, then KJ must have 
possessed the same traits. Because BGF was engaged in murder and the 
sale of drug and weapons, then KJ must have been too. After these 
inferences are created, the Defendant is no longer the “individual 
Defendant” charged with defending himself on a particularized 
indictment, but is instead a proxy for the purported criminal character of 
the entire gang, and juries have no problem with finding gangs guilty. 
IV. MONELL BIFURCATION: A SOLUTION TO PREJUDICIAL GANG 
ALLEGATIONS  
This Part argues that a bifurcation standard, similar to that used in 
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services of City of New York, is the appropriate 
standard to apply to state gang cases to resolve the issues discussed 
previously in this Article, including violations of character evidence rules 
and due process violations.  This Part will begin with a traditional 
example of bifurcation/ severance in a criminal context. It will then 
provide an overview of what Monell bifurcation means, how it has been 
used in subsequent cases such as Heller, and how case law supports the 
application of the Monell bifurcation standard in state gang cases.  
A. Bifurcation and/or Severance in Criminal Cases  
California, Maryland, and Illinois all have evidentiary rules requiring 
 
 153. Id. at 471. 
 154. Id. at 475-76. 
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that the nature of prior convictions not be admitted into evidence in 
criminal trials for defendants charged with felony possession of a 
firearm.155 The policy rationale for this rule is that it protects the due 
process rights of criminal defendants and ensures the traditional rules of 
evidence are followed.156 On a similar note, all fifty states allow severance 
of offenses or co-defendants if a joint trial would result in a violation of 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.157 In fact, severance is mandated when 
the prejudicial effect of other offenses outweighs their probative value.158 
Whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect is tested by 
balancing whether, when a defendant is charged with similar but unrelated 
crimes, the evidence to every offense "would not be mutually admissible 
at separate trials."159 For example, in California, a Defendant may request 
a bifurcated proceeding whenever a felony conviction is an element of an 
offense. For example, when a prosecutor seeks to charge a criminal 
Defendant with felony possession of a firearm, proving a substantive prior 
conviction is element of the offense.160  Because the prior conviction is 
an element of the offense, the criminal Defendant may request a 
bifurcated trial in order to prevent the jury from being potentially 
influenced by the nature or even the specific details of the prior felony 
conviction.   If a Defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the prior felony 
 
 155. California Penal Code §1025(e) states: "If the Defendant pleads not guilty, and answers that 
he or she has suffered the prior conviction, the charge of the prior conviction shall neither be read to the 
jury nor alluded to during trial, except as otherwise provided by law." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025(e) (2019). 
Illinois has adopted a similar rule through case law whereby, if a Defendant stipulates their status as a 
felon, the prosecution is barred from introducing evidence of the nature of the prior conviction because of 
its unduly prejudicial value. People v. Walker, 812 N.E.2d 339, 350-51 (Ill. 2004); see also People v. 
Clark, 542 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. 1989) (reversing Defendant’s conviction because of the effect of prosecutor’s 
comments about the Defendant’s prior conviction in conjunction with other prejudicial comments denied 
the Defendant the right to a fair trial). Maryland too has adopted a similar rule. See Carter v. State, 824 
A.2d 123 (Md. Ct. App. 2003). In Carter, the state's highest court held that the trial court was not permitted 
to admit evidence of the nature of the Defendant's prior felony conviction because he had stipulated to the 
prior conviction making the substance of the crime irrelevant. Id. 
 156. Walker, 812 N.E.2d at 351 (reasoning that any stipulation to the prior conviction offered the 
same probative value as if established by the prosecution, meaning that any admission of evidence 
regarding the nature of the prior conviction would be more prejudicial than probative and violate the 
Defendant’s right to a fair trial).  
 157. Severance is used for severing trials for separate trials and for separating co-Defendants. For 
example, Maryland Rule 4-253(c) allows for a severance motion when charges or Defendants have been 
prejudicially joined, stating: "If it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder for trial of 
counts, charging documents, or Defendants, the court may, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, 
order separate trials of counts, charging documents, or Defendants, or grant any other relief as justice 
requires." MD.R.EVID. 4-253(c). Illinois shares this rule. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-8 (LexisNexis 
2019). California also has a rule for severance. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (Procedures governing 
charging more than one count or offense).  
158.   See CAL. PENAL CODE § 954. 
 159. Ellerba v. State, 398 A.2d 1250, 1259-60 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (quoting McKnight v. 
State, 375 A.2d 551, 556 (Md. Ct. App. 1977)). 
160.  People v. Calderon, 885 P.2d 83 (Cal. 1994).   
30
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/4
2019] PRESERVING DUE PROCESS 159 
being tried in a unitary trial, the count will be severed or bifurcated.161 
These concepts—bifurcation and severance—are deeply rooted in our 
traditions of providing a defendant with full due process rights under the 
constitution.   
B. Bifurcation in Civil Rights Cases 
Bifurcation is a method used where the Plaintiff in a constitutional civil 
rights matter must first prove that a State violated their constitutional 
rights before being able to proceed against the municipality on a Monell 
claim.162 A Monell claim refers to a lawsuit against a State entity (i.e. a 
police department, municipal entities, government agency, etc.) that 
claims that the State’s use of custom163 or policies violate the 
constitutional rights of an individual. More simply, when a court applies 
bifurcation to Monell claims, it requires that the Plaintiff first prove that 
a constitutional violation occurred before moving on to proving that the 
State’s customs or policies caused violation.164  
Bifurcation is considered standard across several circuits and is applied 
widely, regardless of the facts underlying the case.165 For example, in 
 
 161. Id.  This is embedded in California Penal Code § 1044, where the trial judge is granted 
discretion to decide a motion for bifurcated proceedings under California Penal Code § 1025(b). See CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1044 (2019). California Penal Code § 1025(b) provides: "[e]xcept as provided in 
subdivision (c), the question of whether or not the Defendant has suffered the prior conviction shall be 
tried by the jury that tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty, or in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, by a jury impaneled for that purpose, or by the court if a jury is waived." Id. at § 1025(b). 
 162. Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police 
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 503 (1993) (require the plaintiff to prove that individual officers 
violated her rights before she can produce evidence that the municipality policies are the cause of the 
violation). While this Article does not accept the reasoning of limiting civil litigants from addressing 
pattern or practice evidence prior to a finding of liability, it is accepted that bifurcation is the current state 
of the law. 
 163. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (explaining that 
custom entailed “practices of state officials could well… so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 
‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.”). 
 164. For example, in Belcher, Plaintiff, the estate of the decedent, sued because the decedent had 
committed suicide while in the state’s custody, after the officers had failed to remove the Plaintiff’s 
shoelaces. Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff was unable to prove that the 
individual officers were deliberately indifferent, and therefore, “because it [was] clear that there was no 
constitutional violation, we need not reach the question of whether a municipal policy was responsible for 
the officers’ actions.” Id. In Apodaca, Plaintiff, the estate of decedent, sued the State because a police 
officer responding to a car collided with decedent’s car, killing the decedent. Apodaca v. Rio Arriba Cty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 905 F.2d 1445,1447 (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff was unable to prove that the police had 
acted intentionally. Thus, the court concluded that “because plaintiffs have alleged no federal 
constitutional violations, we need not address the plaintiffs’ claims against the sheriff’s department, 
county, and other officers in their official capacities.” Id. 
 165. See Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming 
lower court’s application of bifurcation where police allegedly choked and threw Plaintiff on the wall 
stating “[o]ur holding today is informed, in part, by the frequent bifurcation of proceedings where a 
plaintiff has initiated a § 1983 action against individual officials and municipal entities.”);  Wilson v. 
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Quintanilla, Defendant officers released police dogs that attacked 
Plaintiff, causing severe injuries.166 Plaintiff brought excessive force 
claims against the Defendant police officers and a Monell claim against 
the City and police department for maintaining unconstitutional policies 
and customs pertaining to the use of police dogs.167 The trial court 
bifurcated the claims, requiring Plaintiff to first prove that the officers 
used excessive force.  After proving excessive force, Plaintiff then 
proceeds to present evidence that the policies used caused the injury, thus 
proving the  Monell claim.168 When Plaintiff attempted to submit evidence 
concerning the customs of the police departments through the use of 
“photographs and medical records of other persons similarly mutilated by 
identically trained dogs, the videotapes showing the training of police 
dogs, and the testimony of Mr. Quintanilla's police practices expert[,]”169 
the trial court denied the Plaintiff’s request, requiring bifurcation.170  
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s bifurcation and denial to 
admit Plaintiff’s evidence of additional dog mutilations and policy 
evidence in the case. The court specifically upheld that, in finding that 
Plaintiff’s evidence was intended to overwhelm the jury in stating, 
“plaintiff's strategy was to convince the jury to award him damages on the 
strength of evidence concerning police dog attacks on others.”171 Similar 
to Quantilla, Courts have upheld bifurcation to avoid overwhelming the 
 
Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming lower court’s application of bifurcation where 
“plaintiffs were arrested, detained for about three hours, and then released without any charges being filed 
against them” and stating “[i]t was not an abuse of discretion to bifurcate individual liability from 
municipal liability, and it would be illogical to try the municipality first since its liability under § 1983 
could not be determined without a determination of the lawfulness of the individuals' actions.”); 
Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming lower court’s application of 
bifurcation where police dogs injured Plaintiff requiring medical attention and stating “under Heller and 
general principles of § 1983 liability, an individual may recover only when that individual's federal rights 
have been violated. The district court correctly entered judgment for the Chief and city based on the jury's 
special verdict that plaintiff's rights were not violated.”). 
 166. Quintanilla, 84 F.3d at 354. 
 167. Id. at 354 (“Quintanilla sued Wells and the two assisting line officers, Keith Biarnesen and 
John Hoekter, on various federal and state grounds, including the asserted use of excessive force through 
the deployment of a police dog in violation of Quintanilla's right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Quintanilla also sued the city of Downey and its Police Chief, 
Clayton Mayes, alleging their maintenance of an unconstitutional custom or policy involving police 
dogs.”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Brief of Appellant-Defendant, Quintanilla v. City of Downey, No. 94-56550, 1995 WL 
17134222, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 1996). The trial court described the evidence as “graphic 
photographs, from unrelated cases, of police dog bite victims; medical summaries, prepared for an 
unrelated case, of persons bitten by police dogs; a videotape of a police dog attack in a different case, and 
a police dog training videotape.” Quintanilla, 84 F.3d at 355. 
 170. Quintanilla, 84 F.3d at 354. 
 171. Id. 
32
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/4
2019] PRESERVING DUE PROCESS 161 
jury with what courts consider prejudicial evidence.172 
Like the Court’s reasoning in Quantilla, this Article asserts that, given 
the due process implications discussed herein, it is impermissible to allow 
the State to rely on gang evidence as a “strategy [] to convince the jury” 
to find the Defendant guilty based on the “strength of” the inherent 
prejudicial nature of gang evidence. Rather, like Quantilla and a litany of 
cases applying bifurcation, courts should apply bifurcation to gang cases 
to safeguard the Defendant’s due process rights.  
1. Gang Cases That Bifurcate  
In order to protect a criminal Defendant’s right to a fair trial, three 
courts have discussed applying a bifurcation standard, similar to Monell, 
in gang cases. These courts have reasoned that the prejudicial nature of 
gang evidence requires bifurcation.173 Similar to the reasoning in these 
cases, this Article argues174 that the state must first prove the underlying 
offense, and only if the Defendant is found guilty can the State introduce 
gang evidence. In essence, this Article argues that a State’s ability to 
introduce gang evidence should function similar to Plaintiff’s ability to 
prove custom and policies in a Monell claim.175 
For example, Nevada charges gang crimes as enhancement penalties to 
an offense, rather than as a substantive charge.176 By doing so, Nevada 
restricts the introduction of gang evidence in sentencing hearings which 
bifurcates the evidence from the trial.177   In Gonzales,178 the Court 
 
 172. Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2nd Cir. 1999) (noting “that the 
plaintiff wished to introduce evidence . . . consisted in part of the personnel records of police officers, 
including the individual Defendants, as well as a history of all claims of excessive force brought against 
the entire Police Department” which were considered “prejudicial” to the Defendant officers). 
 173. State v. Galtney, No. A07-1631, 2008 WL 5135647, at *4, n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2008); 
Gonzalez v. State, 366 P.3d 680, 688 (Nev. 2015); State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 2006). 
 174. While bifurcation is the accepted standard in Monell, claims against government entities, 
neither this paper, nor does this author, accepts that section 1983 Civil Rights Claims should be in fact 
bifurcated.  Rather, this paper concedes that law, as it stands now, requires bifurcation because of the 
unduly prejudicial nature of pattern and practice evidence, so by way of extension, gang evidence, should 
be excluded using the same standard.   
 175. See Gonzalez, 366 P.3d at 688 (reversing conviction after evidence of gang membership was 
admitted before underlying murder charge resulted in a guilty finding). 
 176. Id. at 687-88 (“evidence used to prove the existence of a criminal gang, is a type of evidence 
that would generally not be admissible during a guilt phase of a trial but is statutorily admissible in order 
to prove a gang enhancement.”). 
 177. Id. This is not to say that gang evidence is never admissible during trial but rather that the court 
does not allow the introduction of the evidence “solely for the purpose of proving a gang enhancement.” 
 178. Id. at 682. Gonzalez involved a “brawl between members of two motorcycle gangs, the Vagos 
and the Hell's Angels . . . the fight was instigated by Stuart Rudnick, a member of the Vagos. During the 
fight, another member of the Vagos, appellant Ernesto Manuel Gonzalez, shot and killed Jethro Pettigrew, 
a member of the Hell's Angels. At trial, Rudnick testified that he and Gonzalez had a meeting prior to the 
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likened gang evidence to “introducing evidence of prior convictions in 
order to establish that the Defendant is an ex-felon,” stating:  
 
Is evidence of a prior conviction more prejudicial than the evidence presented 
here by a gang expert—namely, that [the Defendant] was a member of a 
criminal gang whose members in Arizona commonly sell narcotics, possess 
stolen property, and commit assault and homicide? Is it more prejudicial than 
the evidence presented by another gang expert that [the Defendant] is a 
member of a criminal gang that moves firearms, tries to set up robberies of 
dope dealers, tries to extort motorcycles from people, traffics in narcotics, and 
commits rape? This, among other highly prejudicial evidence used to prove the 
existence of a criminal gang evidence, is a type of evidence that would 
generally not be admissible during a guilt phase of a trial.179 
 
Gonzalez makes clear that the unduly prejudicial impact of gang 
evidence is just as significant as prior conviction evidence.180 Thus, gang 
evidence, like prior conviction evidence, is prejudicial. Being that gang 
evidence is clearly prejudicial, Gonzales concludes, much like this Article 
does, that the law must safeguard the criminal Defendant through 
bifurcation.   
In State v. Jackson, the concurring opinion for the Court of Appeals of 
Minnesota similarly expressed concern over the introduction of gang 
evidence.  Specifically, the dissent noted that gang expert testimony 
should be limited “to prevent the unfair prejudice that the character and 
other crime aspects of gang evidence may have on the jury's evaluation 
of the evidence concerning a Defendant's guilt for the underlying crimes.” 
The dissent went on to write that the trial court should “bifurcate … for 
trial” the underlying offense from the gang evidence.181  
Jackson was later adopted by the majority in Galtney,182 where the 
 
fight with the president of the international chapter of the Vagos. Rudnick further testified that the 
president put out a ‘green light’ on Pettigrew, meaning that Pettigrew was to be killed.” Id. 
 179. Id. at 687. 
 180. In Old Chief, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the use of prior convictions, stating that 
“there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk 
of unfair prejudice to the Defendant.”  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997). 
 181. State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 701 (Minn. 2006) (Hanson, J. dissenting). In Jackson, the 
Defendant an alleged gang member, shot and killed an individual. Id. at 687 (majority opinion). A gang 
expert witness was permitted to testify that “[t]he gang world operates under a whole different set of rules” 
that encourage killing non-gang members who are on gang territory.  The majority found that while the 
gang expert testimony was admissible to “assist[] the jury in deciding whether the commission of crimes 
is one of the primary activities of the Bloods gang, a prerequisite for proving that the Bloods gang meets 
the statutory definition of a “criminal gang.” Id. at 692. 
 182. In Galtney, the trial court allowed the admission of gang expert testimony despite first hand 
witnesses who testified to the Defendant’s gang membership. Because Minnesota law cautioned against 
the introduction of gang experts, where such as evidence is cumulative, the appellate court found the trial 
court’s introduction of such evidence was in error,  stating “Considering the cautionary instruction given 
by the supreme court in Jackson, this expert witness testimony should not have been used here because it 
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court noted that “undue prejudice could have been avoided by bifurcating 
the underlying charge, with the consent of the Defendant, for trial from 
the charge of being committed for the benefit of a gang.”183  
As these cases show, courts have begun applying bifurcation in the 
context of gang cases because of the prejudicial nature of gang 
evidence.184 Bifurcation provides a way to minimize the prejudicial nature 
of gang evidence by limiting the ability for gang evidence to overwhelm 
or taint the jury into “view[ing] [the Defendant] only as a dangerous 
member of a dangerous group, one who is certainly capable (and quite 
possibly guilty) of committing any of the criminal activities and antisocial 
behaviors ascribed to the organization—not least of all the particular 
crime charged.”185  While it is true that a finding of guilt on the 
substantive offense may prejudice the Defendant during the bifurcated 
gang proceeding, this prejudice is not the undue prejudice that occurs 
when the gang evidence is admitted without bifurcation.186 Thus, 
bifurcation within the context of gangs will provide the Defendant with a 
fairer trial, free from the possibility the Defendant will be convicted 
simply due to propensity reasoning based on character evidence admitted 
through gang evidence statutes. 
 
was cumulative in light of testimony from the victim and the other three officers regarding the prior 
statements of appellant and Anthony admitting they were members of a gang.” State v. Galtney, No. A07-
1631, 2008 WL 5135647, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2008).  
 183. Galtney, 2008 WL 5135647, at *1, n.1 (citing Jackson, 714 N.W.2d at 701 (Hanson, J. 
dissenting)). 
 184. For example, in Gutierrez v. State, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (Md. Ct. App. 2011), the Maryland Court of 
Appeals stated that “we remain ever-cognizant of the highly incendiary nature of gang evidence and the 
possibility that a jury may determine guilt by association rather than by its belief that the Defendant 
committed the criminal acts,” but found that the Defendant’s membership in MS-13 was more relevant to 
the motive of the murder than prejudicial. Gutierrez v. State, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (Md. Ct. App. 2011); see also 
State v. Torrez, 210 P.3d 228, 235 (N.M. 2009) (stating that “evidence of gang affiliation could be used 
improperly as a backdoor means of introducing character evidence by associating the Defendant with the 
gang and describing the gang's bad act,” but concluding that the evidence could be admitted to the extent 
that it spoke to Defendant’s motive); People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) 
(reasoning that evidence of gang membership and activities was relevant to prove Defendant’s intent and 
motive).  
 185. United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2013) (Holloway, J., dissenting). 
 186. For example, it is possible that a finding of guilt of the substantive offense may disentangle 
the gang evidence from the substantive offense so as to find the Defendant guilty of the substantive offense 
but not the gang statute. In Burris, the State failed to build a nexus between the Defendant and the gang 
evidence. Burris v. State, 78 A.3d 371, 387 (Md. Ct. App. 2013) (“With respect to the issue of 
admissibility of Sergeant Workley's testimony relative to witness recantation, Sergeant Workley said 
absolutely nothing to connect Burris's BGF membership to the reasons for several witnesses recanting in 
Burris's case.”). Although Burris was not charged with the gang statute, if had he been, the appellate 
court’s finding of the lack of nexus is precisely what the jurors can do in finding that the substantive 
offense may be proven, but that the substantive offense lacks a nexus to gang activity. This allows the 
jurors to find the Defendant guilty of the substantive offense and not of violating gang statutes. 
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C. City of Los Angeles v. Heller 
The use of bifurcation in gang cases is consistent with the original 
rationale pf City of Los Angeles v. Heller—the Supreme Court case 
credited with the initial requirement of bifurcation in Monell claims.187 In 
Heller, Plaintiff sued the officers and the city of Los Angeles after 
sustaining injuries during the course of an arrest, alleging that department 
policies encouraged the use of excessive force.188 The trial court 
bifurcated the claim, first requiring that the Plaintiff prove the officers 
committed a constitutional violation. Then, only if a constitutional 
violation was found could the Plaintiff then argue that the police customs 
or policies were responsible for his injuries.189  
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, reasoning that because 
the State was only liable by being “legally responsible” for the police 
officer’s actions, “if the [officer] inflicted no constitutional injury on 
respondent, it is inconceivable that petitioners could be liable to the 
respondent.”190 The Supreme Court thus found bifurcation logical where 
liability of the State was contingent on a finding that the State agent 
committed a constitutional violation.191 The Court further reasoned that 
where there is no constitutional injury, “If a person has suffered no 
constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact 
that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of 
constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”192  
D. Illustrations of the Use of Bifurcation in Gang Cases 
In the context of gang cases, the reasoning of Heller equally applies.  
Just as a Monell claim cannot occur unless there is a constitutional 
violation, the conviction of a criminal Defendant under the 
aforementioned gang statutes is dependent on whether an underlying 
crime occurred.193 Gang membership alone is not a crime194 because 
 
 187. Colbert, supra note 162, at 503. 
 188. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 797–98 (1986). 
 189. Id. Ultimately during trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Defendant officers and the trial 
court then dismissed the Monell claims against the State, reasoning that if the officers had “been 
exonerated by the jury [of excessive force] there could be no basis for assertion of liability against the 
city.” 
190.   Id.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 797. 
193.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-804(a)(1). (requiring the Defendant to participate in a criminal 
gang for the statute to be applicable and have as one of their primary objectives or activities the 
commission of one or more underlying crimes). 
 194. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168 (1992) (finding that gang membership alone was a 
First Amendment right); see also Cross v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 73 A.3d 1186, 1195-96 (Md. Ct. 
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freedom to associate with whomever you please is a protected First 
Amendment right.195 In Dawson, the Supreme Court squarely addressed 
this issue, noting that the Defendant’s membership in the Aryan Nation 
invoked the “the First Amendment protect[ion] [of] an individual's right 
to join groups and associate with others holding similar beliefs.”196  Thus, 
just like the State’s liability in a Monell claim will only attach if a 
constitutional violation occurs, a Defendant is only guilty of violating 
state gang statutes once the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a substantive crime, separate and apart from being a gang member, 
occurred.  
 In the words of Heller, “[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional 
injury at the hands of the individual police officer,” then, “the fact that the 
departmental regulations might have authorized the use of 
constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”197  Even under 
Quantilla, discussed supra, which adopts the Heller bifurcation standard, 
the fact that Plaintiff had evidence of other identical dogs attacking 
arrestees was “quite beside the point” of whether the Plaintiff proved that 
the officers in the particular case acted unreasonably in using the dog. 
Then in a gang case, likewise, if a person has suffered no violation of 
criminal law at the hands of the individual Defendant, the Court should 
conclude that the fact that the gang’s propensities, structure or 
representation might have motivated  the violation of criminal law is quite 
beside the point. Accordingly, even the reasoning underlying bifurcation 
in Heller supports an application of bifurcation in this state gang case. 
E. Heller Supports Application of a Bifurcation in Gang Cases  
One implicit and subtle basis for bifurcation that courts and scholars 
have recognized is the need to protect police officers and the State from 
liability.198 Taxpayers generally, and municipalities specifically, are 
responsible for paying judgements for police brutality claims that arise 
out of civil rights violations.  This being the case, courts have provided a 
means to limit liability of government agencies, even if it is the policies 
 
Spec. App. 2013) (finding that appellant, a Baltimore City Police Officer, had a right to associate with her 
husband, a gang member). 
 195. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168. 
 196. Id.; see also Cross, 73 A.3d at 1195-96.  
 197. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). 
 198. Colbert, supra note 162, at 548 (“juror sympathy for individual officers is often decisive when 
civil rights claims are bifurcated. First, jurors' general sense of fairness mitigates against blaming an 
officer for causing a constitutional injury when he merely carried out department policy as an obedient 
employee. Second, most jurors are predisposed to credit police officers' testimony. They see the officer's 
job as difficult and dangerous; police officers protect them and other law-abiding citizens from dangerous 
people. Jurors are receptive to suggestions that the officer had insufficient time to reflect or deliberate in 
the face of a life-threatening situation.”). 
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and practices of that particular agency that cause harm to the citizenry.199  
To save public dollars and preserve the sanity of police officers, courts 
bifurcate the substantive claim from the pattern or practice claim.  
Because jurors are often sympathetic to officers, jurors are likely to find 
that officers did not violate the constitutional rights of Defendants, thus 
relieving the officer and State of any liability.200  
On the surface, these things may seem like an incongruent reason to 
apply bifurcation to state gang cases and criminal Defendants. Yet, this 
Article encourages the reclaiming the Bill of Rights and its protections 
from the very system and agents that oppress the alleged or actual gang 
members.  The Supreme Court has created precedent affirming 
fundamental rights, such as the Sixth Amendment right to Confront and 
the Fifth Amendment Right to remain silent, regardless of a case’s 
allegedly horrendous nature. This precedent has allowed Defendants to 
reclaim their constitutionally guaranteed rights.201  
This Article advocates for the principles set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Miranda and Davis—that Defendants, no matter how horrendous the 
crime is perceived, are entitled to their constitutional rights. Accordingly, 
reclaiming Constitutional rights through the tools from the system that 
oppresses Defendants in gang cases, is in tandem with the reasoning in 
this article.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
This Article ends with the same story with which it started: the story of 
 
199.  “It is clear from conversations with municipal defense attorneys and plaintiffs' attorneys that 
municipalities have a strong policy in favor of settling Monell claims in order to avoid the potential 
damage, both economic and political, that would result if a jury held them liable for a section 1983 
violation.” Colbert, supra note 162, at 504. 
 200. Colbert, supra note 162, at 548. 
 201. For example, Miranda, the namesake for Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966), was 
found “guilty of kidnapping and rape.” The Court in Miranda set the precedent for what is now commonly 
referred to as “Miranda Warnings,” and related Fifth amendment due process rights. Id. In dissent, Judge 
Clark argued that the horrendousness of the allegations alone outweighed the due process concerns in 
stating “Society has always paid a stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of 
the dark moments of the law . . . it may make the analysis more graphic to consider the actual facts of  . . 
. [o]n March 3, 1963, an 18-year-old girl was kidnapped and forcibly raped near Phoenix, Arizona. . . Yet 
the resulting confessions, and the responsible course of police practice they represent, are to be sacrificed 
to the Court's own finespun conception of fairness which I seriously doubt is shared by many thinking 
citizens in this country.” Id. at 517–21 (Clark, J., dissenting). In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832–
33, 224 (2006), the Supreme Court expressly rejected a relaxation of a Defendant’s confrontation clause 
rights, stating that “[r]espondents in both cases, joined by a number of their amici, contend that the nature 
of the offenses charged in these two cases—domestic violence—requires greater flexibility in the use of 
testimonial evidence. This particular type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion 
of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives 
the criminal a windfall. We may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect 
of allowing the guilty to go free.” Id. 
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KJ.  KJ was sentenced to two life sentences plus 15 years in prison. KJ 
was federally indicted under RICO and sentenced to an additional life 
sentence, based on the same allegation he had just been found guilty of in 
state court. He filed in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, raising 
10 separate issues, many deriving from the same arguments posed here. 
The appeal was denied, and he currently awaits certification to the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland.   
State gang case bifurcation is not a wholesale solution to the issue of 
unduly prejudicial character evidence and due process violations of 
criminal Defendants who are defined as gang members. State gang 
bifurcation can only provide legal relief to Defendants, like KJ, whose 
due process rights concerning inadmissible character evidence are 
diminished due to the State’s and legislatures’ ability to diminish these 
rights under the guise of fighting exaggerated gang rates through gang 
statutes.202  
Bifurcation of state gang allegation in KJ’s criminal trial would have 
prevented the jury from hearing evidence from a previously dismissed 
case.   Had the proposed bifurcation method been enacted, a former plea 
deal,203 whereby KJ was originally charged for attempted murder, would 
not have been admissible unless the State had shown that an attempted 
murder had been committed and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.204 
Accordingly, bifurcation would have restrained the State’s ability to 
violate KJ’s double jeopardy rights by introducing previously adjudicated 
crimes; the State would have been required to prove the underlying cause 
of action before being able to use the previously adjudicated crime as a 
basis for the gang statute violation.  
Bifurcation for KJ would have meant that a “gang expert,” who was 
neither a psychologist, sociologist or possessed any formalized training 
to formalize opinions of psychology or sociology of gangs or member, 
nor published or written scholarly articles on gangs, and who testified to 
a rubric which was not provided nor written,205 would likely not withstand 
an application of Frye. Even if this “gang expert” had withstood the Frye 
standard, the State could not introduce such prejudicial evidence from an 
alleged “gang expert” until the underlying offenses were proven. Thus, 
bifurcation would diminish the State’s ability to violate KJ’s 
constitutional right to a fair trial.  
Bifurcation for KJ would also have meant that the jury would not have 
heard prejudicial character evidence until after the jury first, after finding 
 
 202. Discussed supra in Section II. 
 203. In Maryland, a dismissal based on a plea agreement invokes double jeopardy. Mason v. State, 
488 A.2d 955 (Md. Ct. App. 1985). 
 204. Tr., State of Maryland v. KJ, No. 113310058, 172-95 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2015).  
 205. Tr., State of Maryland v. KJ, No. 113310058, 40-44 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 7, 2016). 
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sufficient evidence, found KJ guilty of the substantive offense. The State 
would have had to prove the case without overwhelming the jury with bad 
character evidence and propensity reasoning, thereby preserving KJ’s 
constitutional right to a fair trial.  
It is important to note, however, that while bifurcation would limit the 
introduction of prejudicial evidence, bifurcation would not exclude the 
State’s ability to capitalize on bad character evidence during the gang 
penalty stage of the trial and during sentencing.  
Bifurcation for KJ and Defendants like KJ, would not mean a change 
or a solution to the over-incarceration of young Black and Latino men 
from marginalized and oppressed communities.  Bifurcation of state gang 
cases would not mean a halt to mass incarceration or a means for young 
Black and Latino men to escape the reach of systematic racism. 
Bifurcation in state gang cases does not mean an end to the criminal 
justice system’s ability to criminalize young Black and Latino men, while 
claiming the law is meant to bring peace and stability to the very 
community it intends to destroy through over policing. Only fundamental 
restructuring of the criminal justice system, abolition, can end mass 
incarceration. An application of bifurcation standards to state gang cases 
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